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INTRODUCTION
Two controversial and pressing issues in U.S. constitutional law are the extent
to which courts should consult foreign constitutions and the extent to which courts
should interpret the U.S. Constitution to apply to U.S. conduct abroad. Indeed,
the first issue divided the U.S. Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas1 and Roper
v. Simmons,2 prompting various senators to question Court nominees on this subject in the confirmation hearings3 and generating various resolutions and bills
forbidding courts to consult foreign law in interpreting the U.S. Constitution.4
And the second issue has recently received significant scholarly,5 media,6 and
1

539 U.S. 558 (2003).
543 U.S. 551 (2005).
3
See, e.g., Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, to Be
an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 348–50 (2009) [hereinafter Confirmation Hearing of
Hon. Sotomayor].
4
See, e.g., American Justice for American Citizens Act, H.R. 4118, 108th Cong. (2004);
Constitution Restoration Act of 2004, H.R. 3799, 108th Cong. (2004); Constitutional Preservation Resolution, H.R. Res. 446, 108th Cong. (2003).
5
See, e.g., KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG? THE
EVOLUTION OF TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW (2009); Christina Duffy Burnett, A
Convenient Constitution? Extraterritoriality After Boumediene, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 973
(2009); Gerald L. Neuman, The Extraterritorial Constitution After Boumediene v. Bush, 82
S. CAL. L. REV. 259 (2009).
6
For example, there was significant media commentary on the transnational applicability of the Establishment Clause following the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) Inspector General’s Office July 17, 2009, audit questioning whether
some of USAID’s programs violate the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Colum Lynch, In
Fighting Radical Islam, Tricky Course for U.S. Aid, WASH. POST, July 30, 2009, at A12;
Colum Lynch, Programs’ Religious Ties Raise Concerns, WASH. POST, July 23, 2009, at A8.
In particular, the audit report questions the constitutionality of USAID’s funding of the repair
of Iraqi mosques and funding of an African sex education program infused with religious
messages. Jesse Merriam, Establishment Clause-Trophobia: Building a Framework for
Escaping the Confines of Domestic Church-State Jurisprudence, 41 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
2
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policy7 attention, largely due to its significant implications for the War on Terror
and its relevance to the Guantanamo Bay decisions.8 This Article engages both of
these issues by using comparative constitutionalism to inform the Constitution’s
transnational applicability.9
This Article thus extends a previous piece in which I explored the transnational
applicability of the Establishment Clause,10 and in so doing, derived from the Supreme Court’s precedents the following framework for the transnational applicability
of all provisions11 of the Constitution: If a constitutional claim arises in a land over
701 (2010); see also OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., AUDIT OF USAID’S FAITH-BASED AND
COMMUNITY INITIATIVES (2009), available at http://oig.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/audit
-reports/9-000-09-009-p.pdf.
7
In 2010, the Chicago Council on Global Affairs released a report which covered various
issues relating to U.S. foreign policy and religion, including how the Establishment Clause
applies abroad. Task Force on Religion and the Making of U.S. Foreign Policy, The Chicago
Council on Global Affairs, Engaging Religious Communities Abroad: A New Imperative for
U.S. Foreign Policy, http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/UserFiles/File/Task Force Reports
/2010 Religion Task Force_Full Report.pdf. In 2007, the Center for Strategic and International
Studies (“CSIS”) published a similar report. Liora Danan, Mixed Blessings: U.S. Government
Engagement with Religion in Conflict-Prone Settings, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INT.
STUD. (August 20, 2007), http://csis.org/publication/mixed-blessings. Since publishing the
report, CSIS has held several meetings that have brought together government officials and
legal scholars with the goal of clarifying the First Amendment’s application abroad. See, e.g.,
PCR Event: Religion and Foreign Policy Series: July 25, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INT.
STUD., http://CSIS.org/blog/pcr-event-religion-and-foreign-policy-series-July-25 (last visited
Oct. 14, 2012).
8
See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.
507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). Of these cases, only Boumediene squarely
addressed the Constitution’s transnational applicability, and this decision was unclear on
what standard it employed to determine how the Suspension Clause applies to Guantanamo
Bay,a land controlled by and under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, but leased
and not legally owned by it. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229.
9
See infra Part II.B.3.b.
10
Merriam, supra note 6, at 699.
11
I emphasize “all provisions” because some commentators, wrongly in my opinion, have
urged for courts to apply a different framework for structural guarantees than for individualrights guarantees, with structural guarantees applying almost wherever and whenever the
United States acts, and individual rights applying in a much narrower set of circumstances.
See, e.g., Jessica Powley Hayden, Note, Mullahs on a Bus: The Establishment Clause and
U.S. Foreign Aid, 95 GEO. L.J. 171 (2006); Jessica Powley Hayden, Note, The Ties That
Bind: The Constitution, Structural Restraints, and Government Action Overseas, 96 GEO.
L.J. 237, 248 (2007); Robert Knowles & Marc D. Falkoff, Toward a Limited-Government
Theory of Extraterritorial Detention, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 637, 646–48 (2007). I
believe that banking the analysis on this structural-individual rights distinction is flawed for
several reasons—one being that there is often not a tight conceptual distinction between
structural and individual rights, and another that there is little to no basis in Supreme Court
doctrine for basing the extraterritorial applicability of a right on the basis of such a distinction. For further discussion of this issue, see Merriam, supra note 6, at 723–25.
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which the United States exercises absolute control or exclusive jurisdiction, and if the
court deems that the claim involves a “fundamental meaning”12 of the Constitution,
then the court should apply the same standard abroad as would apply if the claim had
arisen domestically.13 And if neither of these conditions is satisfied, then the court
should not enforce the Constitution at all.14 But the court should apply an intermediate standard if only one of these conditions is met; under this intermediate standard,
the court should apply the Constitution abroad just as it would apply domestically
unless doing so would be “impracticable and anomalous.”15 Although this framework by no means necessarily follows from all of the Court’s decisions on the
Constitution’s applicability abroad, I believe it is the best characterization of those
decisions, as both a descriptive and normative matter.
A significant weakness in this framework, however, is the ambiguity of the
“impracticable and anomalous” standard. Indeed, the syntactic structure of the
“impracticable and anomalous” standard is still unclear, as the Court has not clarified whether it is a disjunctive or conjunctive standard, and there is also confusion
about the standard’s semantic content, since the Court has provided little insight into
what these words mean in this context.16 With so many ambiguities, the doctrine
itself is impracticable because judges cannot apply it objectively and predictably, and
it is also anomalous in the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence, because although
many judicial doctrines contain some ambiguity, it is difficult to think of one whose
semantic content and syntactic structure are this amorphous.
12

By a “fundamental meaning,” I refer to how, as explained in detail in my previous article
on the subject, the Court has treated the question of fundamentality in this context differently
from how it has treated that question in incorporating rights to apply to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Merriam, supra note 6, at 745–46. Whereas in incorporating
rights the Court has generally inquired whether an entire constitutional provision should
apply to the states, in the extraterritorial context, what I have called “excorporation,” as it is
the inverse of incorporation, the Court has more narrowly inquired “whether a particular
meaning of a constitutional provision should apply” abroad. Id. at 745. Compare Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (holding that “the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees
a right of jury trial in all criminal cases which—were they to be tried in a federal court—
would come within the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee” (emphasis added)), with Reid v.
Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74–78 (1957) (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial in
criminal prosecutions always applies only in capital cases, because only in these instances
is the meaning of the right fundamental for purposes of applying it abroad) (Harlan, J.,
concurring). Incidentally, in my previous article, I miscited the Reid incorporation analogue
as Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967), which incorporated only the right to a
speedy trial, not the right to a trial by an impartial jury. See Merriam, supra note 6, at 745.
That right was not incorporated until the next year in Duncan. Duncan, 391 U.S. 145.
13
Merriam, supra note 6, at 742.
14
Id. at 742–43.
15
Id. at 743.
16
Reid, 354 U.S. at 74–75 (using the words “impractical” and “impracticable” interchangeably in applying the standard).
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Although there has been little scholarly inquiry into how to apply the standard,
the issue is heating up, as are the policy consequences and implications.17 Professors
Gerald Neuman and Christina Duffy Burnett, two leading lights on the Constitution’s transnational applicability, have both recently written significant articles on
how they believe courts should and do apply the standard,18 though both agree that
“a full elaboration and defense of [the standard] has yet to be written.”19 This Article
undertakes this challenge to become the first “full elaboration and defense of” the
standard, and in the process, to make it more practicable as a judicial doctrine and
less anomalous in the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence.
Although Neuman has criticized the standard for giving courts too much discretion and lacking a “textual anchor”20 in the Constitution, he has recently expressed tentative support for the standard, what he characterizes as a functionalist
approach and has dubbed a form of “balancing” or “global due process.”21 Examining the Court’s use of the standard, Neuman has interpreted the “impracticable”
prong to limit transnational application to situations where “compliance is literally
impossible, or . . . imposes tolerable costs domestically but vastly greater costs in
foreign territory.”22 And he has interpreted the “anomalous” prong to limit transnational application to situations that would create “incongruity with local customs.”23
Neuman acknowledges that there are scholars, including himself at one point, who
have criticized the standard on the ground “that the ‘global due process’ methodology currently involves a troubling degree of indeterminacy.”24 But he now believes
that this indeterminacy does not provide adequate justification for abandoning the
standard altogether.25
Neuman has such faith in the standard because he thinks it is sufficiently clear
but flexible, so that it is capable of being “narrowed over time by the exercise of judicial discretion.”26 To guide courts in this task, Neuman proposes that they consult
17

See, e.g., supra notes 5–8 and accompanying text (positing that this standard is important for the War on Terror).
18
See Burnett, supra note 5; Neuman, supra note 5.
19
Burnett, supra note 5, at 994 n.73 (discussing Professor Neuman’s ideas).
20
Gerald L. Neuman, Extraterritorial Rights and the Constitutional Methodology After
Rasul v. Bush, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2073, 2076 (2005).
21
See GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS,
AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 5–8 (1996) [hereinafter NEUMAN, STRANGERS] (categorizing the
various approaches to applying the Constitution abroad: “universalism,” “membership,”
“mutuality of legal obligation,” and “balancing” or “global due process”). Neuman has expressed his tentative support for the balancing or global due process approach. See, e.g.,
Neuman, supra note 5; Gerald L. Neuman, Understanding Global Due Process, 23 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 365 (2009) [hereinafter Neuman, Global Due Process].
22
Neuman, Global Due Process, supra note 21, at 392.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 365.
25
Id.
26
Id.
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international human-rights law because “[o]ne form of anomalous consequence that
weighs against the extraterritorial application of a constitutional right under the functional approach is the cultural inappropriateness of a distinctive U.S. right in foreign
territories.”27 According to Neuman, looking to international norms “could add more
specificity to the methodology and could partly channel [judicial] discretion.”28
Burnett, however, does not see the “impracticable and anomalous” standard,
even with Neuman’s modifications, as capable of sufficiently constraining judicial
discretion. In Burnett’s view, this functionalist standard will amount to judicial decisions “driven entirely by consequentialist concerns”29—i.e., decisions consisting
simply of judges consulting their policy preferences in determining whether to apply
a particular constitutional provision to a particular set of circumstances. For Burnett,
“because impracticability and anomalousness are such open-ended criteria, the
courts in these cases have ended up wielding a nearly unbounded discretion in
selecting the factors relevant to a determination of what constitutional guarantees
apply when and where.”30
In addition, Burnett argues, the “impracticable and anomalous” standard calls
for courts to ask the wrong question: whereas the standard calls for courts to consider certain practical factors in determining whether a constitutional provision
applies in a particular instance, Burnett contends that courts can and should limit
such consequentialist decisionmaking by considering these practical factors only in
asking how a provision should apply abroad.31 Because Burnett believes that this
latter inquiry fits more comfortably with the Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence, particularly its incorporation of most of the Bill of Rights through the
Fourteenth Amendment, and moreover, because she believes that it will create more
principled judicial decisionmaking, she urges courts to abandon the “impracticable
and anomalous” standard.32 Importantly, abandoning the standard does not present a
difficult task for Burnett, since it seems that based on her interpretations of the relevant cases, particularly the Insular Cases, the standard is not binding precedent.33
Engaging with both Neuman’s prescriptions and Burnett’s criticisms, this Article
explores whether the “impracticable and anomalous” standard is binding law and to
what extent it can generate objective and predictable judicial decisionmaking. And
in the nature of my previous work on the issue, I focus in particular here on how the
standard relates to applying the Establishment Clause abroad.
In so doing, this Article respectfully disagrees with Neuman’s notion that courts
should look to international human-rights standards to determine the fit between a
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

Neuman, supra note 5, at 277.
Neuman, Global Due Process, supra note 21, at 365.
Burnett, supra note 5, at 1002.
Id. at 1004.
Id. at 1042–43.
Id.
Id. at 994.
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constitutional right and the cultural tradition in the land in which it would apply. My
principal problem with Neuman’s prescription is that it would seem to require the
U.S. Constitution to apply with equal force wherever international human-rights
standards are applicable, leading to rather strange results, such as the Establishment
Clause applying with the same force to U.S. conduct in a nation like Pakistan, with
a formally established religion,34 as to such conduct in a country like France that
requires a strict separation of religion and government.35 Instead, to determine when
there would be such rights-culture dissonance, courts should consult the constitution
of the country in question, including not only the constitutional text itself but also
the authoritative interpretations of that text. In this regard, this paper sets the
foundation for a heretofore unexplored form of comparative constitutionalism, an
approach that would seem to satisfy even those like Justice Scalia who hold that
American judges must not interpret the U.S. Constitution according to foreign law.36
This Article also respectfully disagrees with Burnett’s claim that the “impracticable and anomalous” standard is insufficiently clear to generate principled results.
To the contrary, courts can apply, and to some extent have applied, the standard in
a principled and consistent manner that not only honors the integrity of constitutional rights but also ensures sufficient executive and legislative discretion to pursue
U.S. foreign policy interests.37 The trick is to give enough precision to the standard’s
syntactic structure and semantic content so that courts are not simply making the
type of policy judgments that Burnett condemns as improper for the judiciary to
make in this context. With such precision, in fact, the standard is likely to work in
a more principled way than is Burnett’s approach. Indeed, she urges for courts to
treat all constitutional provisions as applying abroad so that the only question would
be how they apply in a particular instance.38 But this requires courts to tailor particular constitutional applications to particular facts, thus inviting the very type of
convenience-based jurisprudence that Burnett rejects. A clearer “impracticable and
anomalous” standard would seem to satisfy Burnett’s criticisms better than would
her own fact-driven approach.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I explores the lineage of the “impracticable
and anomalous” standard to determine whether it is now part of the law under stare
decisis. A close examination of the Court’s use of the standard reveals that it is
binding, even though in binding opinions it has appeared explicitly only in dictum,
and when not in dictum, it has appeared explicitly only in non-binding concurring

34

See PAKISTAN CONST. art. 2.
See 1958 CONST. 1 (Fr.) (“France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and
social Republic.” (emphasis added)).
36
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
37
See Merriam, supra note 6, at 763.
38
Burnett, supra note 5, at 979–81.
35
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opinions.39 Even so, the standard is binding because it was implicitly applied in the
Insular Cases, as Justice Harlan explained in his important concurrence in Reid v.
Covert.40 Moreover, the Insular Cases have become the foundational precedents in
this area of the law, as Justice Kennedy recently affirmed in his majority opinion
in Boumediene v. Bush41 and before that, in his concurrence in United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez.42
Admittedly, though, the precedential status of the Insular Cases is an arguable
point, turning on highly subtle and unresolved matters concerning the interpretation
of precedent in general and the Insular Cases in particular. So for those who reject
my interpretations and insist that Justice Harlan was wrong in proclaiming that the
Insular Cases adopted this standard, the question is not whether the Court should
overrule the standard and opt for a better one. Rather, the question for these commentators is whether the Court should now, for the first time, adopt the standard.
This question turns largely on the standard’s efficacy—that is, whether it furthers
the project, referenced above,43 of applying the Constitution abroad in a principled
and consistent way so that it not only preserves the integrity of constitutional rights
but also ensures sufficient executive and legislative discretion to pursue U.S. foreign
policy interests.
To answer this question, Part II explores what the “impracticable and anomalous”
standard means, and in so doing, divides into three sections. Part II.A explores how
to interpret the “impracticable” prong; this discussion turns on the important point that
“impracticable” is conceptually distinct from “impractical,” a point that, amazingly,
has eluded many scholars and judges, including Justice Harlan, who first explicated
the standard.44 Part II.B examines the “anomalous” prong and the extent to which
foreign constitutions can and should aid this analysis. Based on these discussions,
Part II.C explains that the standard consists of two conceptually distinct prongs and
is therefore different from unitary judicial standards, such as the “arbitrary and capricious” test. Because the “impracticable and anomalous” standard is binary,45 it is
crucial to determine whether the standard is conjunctive or disjunctive, another issue
that has been largely overlooked.46 This is a difficult question, and one on which
39

See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2255–56 (2008) (discussing in dicta
concurring opinions in earlier cases in which the “impracticable and anomalous” standard
was applied); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring).
40
Reid, 354 U.S. at 74–75 (Harlan, J., concurring).
41
Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2254–58.
42
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 277–78 (1990) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
43
See supra text accompanying note 37.
44
Indeed, in Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Reid v. Covert, the opinion that first
explicated the standard, Harlan used “impracticable” and “impractical” interchangeably. See
infra notes 232–37 and accompanying text.
45
See Merriam, supra note 6, at 747–48.
46
Id.
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current law provides little direction, thus making it quite tempting to answer the
question by turning to one’s policy sensibilities—i.e., to urge for a disjunctive standard if one prefers making it harder for courts to apply the Constitution abroad, and
a conjunctive standard for the opposite result. We can limit this policy-based judicial
decisionmaking by turning to the purpose of the standard: to ensure that U.S. foreign
policy is effective (practicable) and culturally sensitive (not anomalous).47 Given that
courts have generally treated these goals as tremendously and equally important,48
it is most consistent with the purpose of the standard to treat it as disjunctive.
Finally, on the basis of these inquiries, the Article concludes by questioning
whether Burnett is right that this is a functionalist standard that cannot generate
consistent and principled judicial decisionmaking.49 My assessment is that the standard, like the framework of which it is a part, consists of both formalist and functionalist elements, and if defined and applied with sufficient rigor, as proposed in this
Article, it can guarantee the consistent and principled decisionmaking of formalism,
as well as the flexible and commonsensical decisionmaking of functionalism.50 Put
more concretely, it will provide what ACLU attorney Cecillia Wang has argued the
Court would serve by adopting the test: “national security and the rule of law.”51
I. THE PRECEDENTIAL LINEAGE OF THE “IMPRACTICABLE AND
ANOMALOUS” STANDARD
The “impracticable and anomalous” standard first explicitly appeared in a
Supreme Court opinion in Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Reid v. Covert.52
Harlan’s opinion was the binding opinion, because the plurality opinion, written
by Justice Black, was significantly broader, urging for all constitutional provisions
to apply whenever and wherever the United States acted abroad.53 Importantly,
though, Harlan’s discussion of the standard appeared only in dictum, as discussed
at length below.54
47

Id. at 746–47.
Id. at 747–48.
49
See Burnett, supra note 5, at 974–78.
50
See Merriam, supra note 6, at 764.
51
Cecillia Wang, Guest Blogger: Boumediene v. Bush: Avoiding a Pyrrhic Victory,
ACSBLOG, http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/node/11938 (Dec. 4, 2007, 6:50 PM) (“By adopting the ‘impracticable and anomalous’ test in Boumediene, the Court would serve both national security and the rule of law.”).
52
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring).
53
Id. at 5–9 (majority opinion). Justice Frankfurter also wrote a concurring opinion in
Reid, so his opinion is also arguably the binding opinion, as it is of similar breadth to
Harlan’s concurrence, with both opinions extending jury-trial rights only to cases involving
capital charges. See id. at 44–45 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). But Harlan’s concurrence, due
to its explicit invocation of the “impracticable and anomalous” standard, has received much
more attention from later scholars and Justices than has Frankfurter’s opinion. See, e.g.,
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
54
See infra Part I.A.
48
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A. Why Justice Harlan’s Invocation of the “Impracticable and Anomalous”
Standard in Reid Was Dictum
The Reid case, and its companion case, Kinsella v. Krueger,55 involved the
applicability of jury-trial rights to civilian dependents facing capital charges for murders committed abroad on military bases under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United
States.56 Harlan proclaimed that the civilian dependents were entitled to jury-trial
rights because capital charges involve “special considerations.”57 But Harlan posited
that had the civilian dependents not been facing capital charges, which would not
involve such special considerations, then the Court would have to extend the jurytrial rights to them only if doing so would not be “impractical and anomalous.”58
Some have read Harlan’s reference to the standard as non-dictum on the ground
that the “special considerations” to which Harlan referred were the practicability and
non-anomalousness of applying jury-rights abroad in capital cases.59 To be sure, there
is some basis for this interpretation, since Harlan did mention that “[t]he number of
[capital] cases would appear to be so negligible that the practical problems of affording the defendant a civilian trial would not present insuperable problems.”60 But this
was the only reference Harlan made to the convenience of providing jury trials for
capital as opposed to non-capital cases.61
By contrast, he expounded at length on the vital importance of the right to a
jury trial in a capital case, a case where a person’s life is literally at issue.62 As Harlan
put it, he could “not concede that whatever process is ‘due’ an offender faced with
a fine or a prison sentence necessarily satisfies the requirements of the Constitution
in a capital case.”63 Moreover, to justify this distinction between capital and noncapital cases in the Court’s case law, he cited Powell v. Alabama64 and Betts v.
55

351 U.S. 470 (1956).
The Reid case involved a civilian wife accused of murdering her husband, a member
of the military, while he was stationed in England. See Reid, 354 U.S. at 3. Kinsella involved
the same situation but the murder arose on a U.S. military base in Japan. See Kinsella, 351
U.S. at 471–74.
57
Reid, 354 U.S. at 76 (Harlan, J., concurring).
58
Id. at 75–76.
59
See, e.g., Daniel E. Hall, Curfews, Culture, and Custom in American Samoa: An
Analytical Map for Applying the U.S. Constitution to U.S. Territories, 2 ASIAN-PAC. L. &
POL’Y J. 69, 82 (2001). (“Justice Harlan concluded that a right should be extended unless it
can be established that such an extension is impractical and anomalous. He concluded that
in capital cases, such as were at bar in Reid, it would not be impractical or anomalous for the
government to provide jury trials.”).
60
Reid, 354 U.S. at 78 (Harlan, J., concurring).
61
See id. at 74–78.
62
Id. at 77–78.
63
Id. at 77.
64
287 U.S. 45 (1932) (holding that in capital cases, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires states to give indigent defendants access to counsel).
56
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Brady65 for the proposition that the distinction between such types of cases “is by
no means novel.”66 “[N]or,” he concluded “is [the distinction] negligible, being literally that between life and death.”67 In other words, Harlan held that jury-trial rights
are fundamental in capital cases, and the fundamentality of these rights took them
outside the scope of an inquiry concerning their convenience.68 For Harlan, such a
pragmatic analysis would apply in this scenario only if the rights at issue were nonfundamental,69 and because this case did involve a fundamental right, the “impracticable and anomalous” standard did not apply, thus making Harlan’s invocation of
the standard dictum.
That Harlan’s invocation of the standard was dictum, however, is not the end
of the inquiry as to whether the standard is now binding law. This is because Harlan
proclaimed that he derived this standard from binding precedent, the Insular Cases.70
Indeed, Gerald Neuman characterizes Harlan’s opinion as having “reasoned from the
Insular Cases and not about them.”71 Likewise, Justice Kennedy has interpreted this
standard to come from the lesson that Justice Harlan “read the Insular Cases to teach.”72
Moreover, Justice Kennedy has cited Harlan’s use of the standard to support applying it two times himself, the first time in his concurring opinion in United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez,73 and most recently in his majority opinion in Boumediene v.
65

316 U.S. 455 (1942) (holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not incorporate the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to the states in non-capital
cases), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
66
Reid, 354 U.S. at 77 (Harlan, J., concurring).
67
Id.
68
Id. at 77–78.
69
Harlan opined that in such non-capital cases, involving what he called “run-of-the-mill
offenses,” it might be impracticable to extend jury-trial rights because of the cost and
difficulty of administering these rights to this significantly larger number of cases. Id. at
75–76 & n.12. For an analysis of how Harlan suggested applying this standard to such “runof-the-mill offenses,” see infra notes 232–37 and accompanying text. It should also be noted
that in Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960), where the Court
rejected the distinction between capital and non-capital offenses so as to extend jury trials
abroad to civilian dependants charged with non-capital offenses, Justice Harlan dissented on
the ground that, for the purposes of applying the right to a jury trial abroad, that right is
fundamental only in capital cases. Id. at 255–57 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Indeed, affirming
his reasoning in Reid, Harlan explained that the Kinsella Court’s rejection of a distinction
between capital and non-capital cases “passes over too lightly the awesome finality of a capital case, a factor which in other instances has been reflected both in the constitutional adjudications of this Court and in the special procedural safeguards which have been thrown
around those charged with such crimes.” Id. at 255.
70
Id.
71
NEUMAN, STRANGERS, supra note 21, at 93 (second emphasis added).
72
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2255 (2008).
73
494 U.S. 259, 277–78 (1990) (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74 (1957) (Harlan,
J., concurring)).
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Bush.74 Therefore, to determine the precedential status of the “impracticable and
anomalous” standard, we must inquire into the merits of Harlan’s imputing the standard to the Insular Cases, as well as into whether Kennedy made the standard binding
law by invoking it in his Verdugo-Urquidez and Boumediene opinions.
B. Whether Justice Harlan Was Right in Reid in Imputing the “Impracticable
and Anomalous” Standard to the Insular Cases
Before examining the merits of Justice Harlan’s imputing the “impracticable and
anomalous” standard to the Insular Cases, it will be helpful to summarize the two
cases addressing this issue before the Insular Cases, as these decisions influenced
the Insular Cases as well as how the Court later developed the “impracticable and
anomalous” standard.
1. The State of the Law Before the Insular Cases
Dred Scott v. Sandford 75 was the first Supreme Court case to consider how the
Constitution applies abroad. This case infamously arose after a slave, Dred Scott,
claimed that he had become free by virtue of residing for a period in Minnesota (then
part of the Wisconsin Territory).76 The Court rejected Scott’s claim on the ground
that the Court lacked jurisdiction over the matter because African Americans were
not citizens under Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution.77 In dictum, however, the Court addressed the merits of Scott’s claim, declaring that even
if the Court had jurisdiction over the matter, it still would have to deny Scott’s claim
for freedom because the Fifth Amendment treated slaves as property and thus protected a slave-master’s right to bring a slave into a free territory (whether or not that
territory was part of the United States) without losing ownership over the slave.78
Although some scholars have pointed out the Dred Scott decision’s relevance
to debates about the Constitution’s transnational applicability,79 most commentators have treated it as a case principally about slavery, with little significance for
the Constitution’s applicability abroad.80 Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court did not
74

Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2255.
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV.
76
Id. at 493 (Campbell, J., concurring).
77
Id. at 423, 454 (majority opinion).
78
Id. at 446–50.
79
For example, Sandford Levinson has written about how the Dred Scott case addressed
the “meta-issue” of “whether Congress possesses truly ‘plenary,’ that is, unconstrained power
in regard to the territories of the United States.” Sanford Levinson, Installing the Insular
Cases into the Canon of Constitutional Law, in FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE 121, 129–30
(Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall eds., 2001).
80
Id.
75
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directly consider the Constitution’s transnational applicability until 1891, in Ross
v. McIntyre.81
That case arose after a British subject, John Ross, was convicted by a U.S. consular general for committing a murder while serving on an American merchant vessel
stationed in Yokohama, Japan.82 After the consular general sentenced Ross to death,
and President Rutherford B. Hayes commuted his sentence to life imprisonment, Ross
filed a habeas corpus petition in which he argued that his conviction was invalid because it violated his constitutional rights to indictment by a grand jury and trial by
jury.83 The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed, upholding the consular trial on the grounds
that the Constitution’s indictment and jury-trial guarantees “apply only to citizens and
others within the United States, or who are brought there for trial for alleged offences committed elsewhere, and not to residents or temporary sojourners abroad.”84
The Court thus departed from the Dred Scott reasoning and declared for the first
time that the Constitution’s applicability depends on whether the claim arises within
the United States.
2. The Insular Cases
Soon after Ross v. McIntyre, the Supreme Court modified, but upheld, the decision in a series of important cases, now collectively known as the Insular Cases,
addressing whether and how the Constitution applied to the territories the United
States acquired as a result of the Spanish-American War.85 The Constitution’s
81

140 U.S. 453 (1891).
Id. at 454.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 464 (citing Cook v. United States, 138 U.S. 157, 181 (1891)).
85
See Treaty of Peace, U.S.-Spain, arts. I–III, Dec. 10, 1898, S. Treaty Doc. No. 57-182
(acquiring land from Spain). Note that there is some disagreement over which cases count
as one of the Insular Cases, with some scholars including only those cases dealing with the
territories acquired as a result of the Spanish-American War, and other scholars more expansively including cases dealing with the Constitution’s applicability to other newly acquired
territories. At a minimum, the list of Insular Cases includes the following 1901 cases: Fourteen
Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176 (1901); Dooley v. United States (Dooley II),
183 U.S. 151 (1901); Huus v. N.Y. & Porto Rico S.S. Co., 182 U.S. 392 (1901); Downes v.
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901); Dooley v.
United States (Dooley I), 182 U.S. 222 (1901); Crossman v. United States, 182 U.S. 221
(1901); Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901); DeLima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901).
But some scholars add to this list some later cases, as well as cases dealing with other territories. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905); Dorr v. United States, 195
U.S. 138 (1904); Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904); Gonzales v. Williams, 192
U.S. 1 (1904); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903). Professor Efrén Rivera Ramos counts
as many as twenty-three Insular Cases. Efren Rivera Ramos, Deconstructing Colonialism:
The “Unincorporated Territory” as a Category of Domination, in FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC
SENSE 104, 115–16 n.4 (Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall eds., 2001). Bartholomew
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application to these territories was a controversial political issue, leading to many
5–4 Supreme Court decisions pointing in disparate directions depending on the
particular composition of the majority,86 but the Court eventually settled on a doctrine for resolving this issue, what is now known as the “Incorporation Doctrine.”87
The Incorporation Doctrine generally provides that the Constitution’s applicability
turns on whether a territory has been formally incorporated into the United States
through some official governmental action,88 but as we will see below, there is significant room for disagreement on what this precisely means.89 Before we explore
the precise content of the doctrine, however, we must first establish the precedential
status of the doctrine itself.
a. The Precedential Status of the Incorporation Doctrine
The Incorporation Doctrine arose from articles written by some of the leading
legal scholars of the period,90 such as Christopher Columbus Langdell,91 Thomas
Cooley,92 and James Bradley Thayer.93 But it took some time for the doctrine to prevail in the Supreme Court. Indeed, the doctrine first appeared in a Supreme Court
opinion in Justice White’s concurring opinion in one of the first Insular Cases,
Downes v. Bidwell,94 but it did not command a majority until four years later, in
Rasmussen v. United States.95 Finally seventeen years later, in Balzac v. Porto Rico,96
the Incorporation Doctrine “achieve[d] its complete triumph”97 in Chief Justice Taft’s
unanimous decision.
H. Sparrow might have the most expansive list, including thirty-five such cases. BARTHOLOMEW
H. SPARROW, THE INSULAR CASES AND THE EMERGENCE OF AMERICAN EMPIRE 257 (2006).
86
See supra note 85.
87
See infra notes 90–99 and accompanying text.
88
See infra notes 103–04 and accompanying text.
89
See infra Part I.B.
90
SPARROW, supra note 85, at 4–5, 40–41. It should also be noted that Langdell, Cooley,
and Thayer have come to be known as some of the leading legal formalists of that period. As
will be explained below, they left their mark on this area of the law, as it has retained many
formalist elements. See infra Part II.
91
C.C. Langdell, The Status of Our New Territories, 12 HARV. L. REV. 365 (1899).
92
SPARROW, supra note 85, at 41.
93
James Bradley Thayer, Our New Possessions, 12 HARV. L. REV. 464, 471–80 (1899).
94
182 U.S. 244, 287–88 (1901) (White, J., concurring) (“The right to recover is predicated on the assumption that Porto Rico, by the ratification of the treaty with Spain, became
incorporated into the United States, and therefore the act of Congress which imposed the
duty in question is repugnant to Article I, sec. 8, clause 1, of the Constitution . . . . But as the
case concerns no duty on goods going from the United States to Porto Rico, this proposition
must depend also on the hypothesis that the provisions of the Constitution referred to apply
to Porto Rico because that island has been incorporated into the United States.”).
95
SPARROW, supra note 85, at 5.
96
258 U.S. 298 (1922).
97
SPARROW, supra note 85, at 5.
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As Taft summed up the state of the law in Balzac:
The Insular Cases revealed much diversity of opinion in this
court as to the constitutional status of the territory acquired by
the Treaty of Paris ending the Spanish War, but the Dorr Case
shows that the opinion of Mr. Justice White of the majority, in
Downes v. Bidwell, has become the settled law of the court.98
Therefore, through these many cases, starting with Downes and ending with
Balzac, the Incorporation Doctrine became the settled law of the land. And as we
will see below, it is a doctrine that is still largely in place, affirmed in Reid, VerdugoUrquidez, and most recently in the Court’s decision in Boumediene.99 Now that we
have established that the Incorporation Doctrine is indeed settled law under stare
decisis, we are ready to explore its content.
b. The Precise Content of the Incorporation Doctrine
Bartholomew Sparrow defines the Incorporation Doctrine in these terms: “The
United States’ island territories in the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean were
‘unincorporated’ territories that were to receive only unspecified ‘fundamental’ constitutional protections, whereas the ‘incorporated’ territories of continental North
America were a part of the Union and enjoyed the full protections of the U.S.
Constitution.”100 Professor Burnett agrees that “[a]ccording to conventional wisdom,
the Insular Cases held that the Constitution applied in its entirety only to incorporated territories, whereas only ‘fundamental’ rights applied of their own force (‘ex
proprio vigore’) to unincorporated territories.”101
Burnett, however, disagrees with this conventional interpretation.102 Indeed,
according to Burnett, this conventional interpretation holds that courts should consider the status of a given territory to determine whether a particular constitutional
provision applies in a particular instance.103 But as mentioned in the Introduction,
Burnett believes that a better interpretation of the Incorporation Doctrine, as both
a descriptive and a normative matter, is that courts should consider a territory’s
status only to determine how a provision should apply to that territory.104 That is,
courts should treat all rights as applying abroad but then tailor those applications to
the particular circumstances relevant to the territory in question.
98
99
100
101
102
103
104

Balzac, 258 U.S. at 305.
See infra notes 210–11 and accompanying text.
SPARROW, supra note 85, at 5.
Burnett, supra note 5, at 983.
Id. at 984.
Id. at 981.
Id.
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Burnett believes that focusing on the how question only in determining its applicability fits more comfortably with the Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence,
particularly its incorporation of most of the Bill of Rights through the Fourteenth
Amendment.105 As an example, she points out how even after the Supreme Court
incorporated the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial for criminal cases, in Duncan
v. Louisiana,106 the Court went on to determine how that right should be applied in
state courts, as opposed to how it had been applied in federal courts.107 Indeed, in a
series of decisions, the Court found that whereas the right requires a twelve-member
jury and unanimous verdicts in federal courts, it required neither in state courts.108
Just as the practical distinctions between federal and state courts were relevant to
determining how the right to a jury trial applied to the states, not to determining
whether it applied to the states at all, Burnett argues that the Incorporation Doctrine,
properly understood, calls for courts to consider the practical distinctions between
incorporated and unincorporated territories in determining how a particular constitutional provision applies abroad, not in determining whether it applies to unincorporated territories at all.109
Due to this similarity between the Incorporation Doctrine and the incorporation
of the Bill of Rights through the Fourteenth Amendment, Burnett writes that though
this use of the same term for these different doctrines is a mere coincidence, it is
nonetheless “a welcome coincidence.”110 Other scholars have not been as sanguine
about this coincidence; for example, Professor Neuman has found that this use of the
same term in the Court’s jurisprudence is “unfortunate,” due to its liability to cause
confusion between these two different areas of the laws.111 I share Burnett’s welcoming of the coincidence but for slightly different reasons. I do not agree with her
that the Incorporation Doctrine does or should rest on this whether/how distinction,
and, for that matter, I believe she overstates the extent to which the Court’s incorporation of the Bill of Rights to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment rested
on that distinction. Indeed, although the Court has held some incorporated rights
apply less strictly to the states, such as the jury-trial rights mentioned supra, the
Court has held that the vast majority of incorporated rights apply to the states with
exactly the same rigor as their federal analogues in the Bill of Rights apply to the
federal government. Moreover, whenever the Court has applied a constitutional guarantee abroad, it has not stopped short of extending the full protection of that guarantee. In Reid, for example, the Court held that Mrs. Covert was entitled to the same
105

Id.
391 U.S. 145 (1968).
107
Burnett, supra note 5, at 1005, 1028.
108
See, e.g., Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 362 (1972); Williams v. Florida, 399
U.S. 78, 86 (1970).
109
Burnett, supra note 5, at 981.
110
Id. at 982 n.22.
111
NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 21, at 83n.c.
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type of jury trial required in federal court,112 and in Boumediene, the Court held that
the detainees were entitled to the same type of habeas corpus review extended to
other people detained by the government.113 Nevertheless, although I disagree with
Burnett on these points, I agree that the analyses under the Incorporation Doctrine and
the incorporation of the Bill of Rights are quite similar, though distinct in important
ways, with “incorporation” of the Bill of Rights to the states turning on a broader
examination of the fundamentality of a particular right than the “excorporation” of
a right to the world.114
As I will explain below, my interpretation of the Incorporation Doctrine is a middle position between the conventional understanding of the doctrine and Burnett’s
interpretation based on the whether/how distinction.115 According to the conventional interpretation, such as the one provided by Sparrow above, nonfundamental
protections never apply to unincorporated territories.116 According to Burnett’s interpretation, however, nonfundamental protections always apply to these territories
but not always as strictly they as would apply domestically.117 I believe Justice Harlan
was right that nonfundamental protections apply to unincorporated territories, just as
they would apply domestically, but if and only if it would not be impracticable and
anomalous for the protection to apply there.118 Thus, just as the Incorporation Doctrine
is settled law under stare decisis, so too is the “impracticable and anomalous” standard, as discussed below.
c. The Relationship Between the Incorporation Doctrine and the
“Impracticable and Anomalous” Standard
The words “impracticable” and “anomalous” did not appear in any of the
Insular Cases.119 But although the Insular Cases never explicitly invoked this
language, the Court rested the Incorporation Doctrine on the grounds that nonfundamental rights do not apply to unincorporated territories because in such territories, it would often be difficult to apply constitutional rights (i.e., impracticable)
and moreover, when it would not be too difficult, it would often be destructive of
the traditions prevailing in those lands (i.e., anomalous).120 This leaves open the
possibility that the Insular Cases implicitly applied the “impracticable and anomalous” standard.
112

Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
114
Merriam, supra note 6, at 745–46.
115
See infra Part I.B.2.d.
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See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
117
See supra notes 103–04 and accompanying text.
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See infra notes 145–47 and accompanying text.
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See, e.g., Burnett, supra note 5, at 996 (noting that the “impracticable and anomalous”
standard was first articulated in Reid v. Covert).
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See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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Consider, for example, the Balzac opinion.121 That case arose after a newspaper
editor, Jesús M. Balzac, was charged with publishing libelous speech against the
colonial governor.122 After Balzac argued that he had a right to a jury trial under the
Sixth Amendment, and the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico ruled that he did not have
this right, Balzac brought his case to the U.S. Supreme Court.123 Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Taft explained that even though Congress had granted
Puerto Ricans citizenship under the Jones Act of 1917, Congress had not incorporated Puerto Rico, and therefore, under the Incorporation Doctrine, only a fundamental constitutional provision could apply there.124 As Taft put it, “[t]he guaranties
of certain fundamental personal rights declared in the Constitution, as for instance
that no person could be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law, had from the beginning full application in [unincorporated territories like] the
Philippines and Porto Rico.”125 Because the Court did not consider the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial to be one of these “certain fundamental personal rights declared in the Constitution,”126 it held that the right did not apply to Balzac’s case.127
Here, it is worth deliberating on what the Court meant by “full application”128 in
the passage quoted above. This language leaves open the possibility that some nonfundamental rights might apply, though not fully, in unincorporated territories. Indeed,
as mentioned above, Professor Burnett argues in various pieces that commentators
have largely exaggerated the extent to which the Insular Cases foreclosed applying
nonfundamental constitutional provisions to unincorporated territories at all.129 Drawing on the distinction between whether a guarantee applies and how a guarantee applies, she argues that the Insular Cases stand for the proposition that nonfundamental constitutional guarantees do apply abroad, even in unincorporated territories,
but perhaps less strictly than they would apply domestically.130 But this does not by
itself prove my point that the cases invoked the “impracticable and anomalous”
standard; in fact, Burnett marshals this distinction to support her argument that the
Insular Cases did not adopt the standard but rather simply held that in some foreign
territories the Constitution applies with less force than it applies domestically.131
In making this argument, however, Burnett overlooks the extent to which the
Court’s reasoning for limiting the application of the Constitution in these territories
was that applying the Constitution with full force in such territories would not only
121
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124
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130
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Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922).
Id. at 300.
Id.
Id. at 313
Id. at 312–13.
Id. at 312.
Id. at 304–05, 313.
Id. at 313.
See, e.g., Burnett, supra note 5, at 983–84.
Id. at 992–93.
Id. at 979.
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be difficult for the United States to achieve but also destructive of foreign traditions.
The Balzac reasoning is again instructive on this point. Chief Justice Taft explained
that the jury-trial right could not apply in Puerto Rico because it would not be
possible to apply it there:
The jury system needs citizens trained to the exercise of the
responsibilities of jurors. In common-law countries centuries of
tradition have prepared a conception of the impartial attitude
jurors must assume. The jury system postulates a conscious duty
of participation in the machinery of justice which it is hard for
people not brought up in fundamentally popular government at
once to acquire.132
Furthermore, even if it were possible to apply the jury-trial right in Puerto Rico,
perhaps by training people how to think and act as jurors, this would be destructive
of the cultural tradition that had prevailed in that land:
Congress has thought that a people like the Filipinos, or the
Porto Ricans, trained to a complete judicial system which knows
no juries, living in compact and ancient communities, with definitely formed customs and political conceptions, should be permitted themselves to determine how far they wish to adopt this
institution of Anglo-Saxon origin, and when.133
This language might strike us today as paternalistic, imperialistic, and even
racist—and for good reason: it is. Underlying this reasoning is the presupposition
that these cultures were inferior to American culture and therefore unfit for American constitutional values. But this troubling presupposition need not entirely imbue
or taint our understanding of the reasoning in these cases.
That is not to say that the Insular Cases and their progeny are not tainted at all
by their racist and colonialist origins; to the contrary, Burnett correctly points out
that these “cases [were] decided at a time of imperial exuberance in the United States
and [have been] long tainted by association with the proposition that the Constitution
does not ‘follow the flag’ outside the United States.”134 And this taint rightfully exists
because, as Professor Rivera Ramos observes, “[t]he doctrine of the Insular Cases
became a constituent part of the American colonial project.”135
132

Balzac, 258 U.S. at 310.
Id.
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Burnett, supra note 5, at 979.
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EFRÉN RIVERA RAMOS, THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF IDENTITY: THE JUDICIAL AND
SOCIAL LEGACY OF AMERICAN COLONIALISM IN PUERTO RICO 141 (2001). For further discussion of the racist and colonialist dimensions of the Insular Cases, see Levinson, supra
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But it is to say that the legacy of the Insular Cases and their progeny is changing,
with legal scholars increasingly realizing that in many ways the decisions struck a principled compromise among competing constitutional prerogatives, and that this compromise ultimately led the way to progressive decisions such as Boumediene, holding
that the Constitution applies abroad to citizens and non-citizens alike.136 As Burnett puts
it, “after Boumediene, the Insular Cases look rather like sheep in lion’s clothing.”137
This sheep-like quality is evident from the Balzac excerpts above, and many similar ones appearing in the other Insular Cases, indicating that the Court based its
proposition that nonfundamental constitutional guarantees do not apply in unincorporated territories on the ground that it would be impracticable and anomalous to apply these rights in these lands. And there are non-paternalistic, non-imperialistic, and
non-racist reasons for not applying nonfundamental guarantees abroad when it
would be impracticable or anomalous to do so. Put differently, the “impracticable”
prong need not rest on the claim that certain foreigners are unfit for democratic
governance, and the “anomalous” prong need not rest on the claim that certain cultures have historically had inferior forms of government. In fact, there is nothing
problematic—only something laudable—about wanting the Constitution to apply
in a way that is both practicable and culturally sensitive.
This might be a good time to sum up what we have established thus far: (1) that
the Incorporation Doctrine is binding law under stare decisis,138 (2) that the Incorporation Doctrine rests on the proposition that the impracticability and anomalousness
of applying nonfundamental rights to unincorporated territories is relevant to their
applicability in those territories,139 and (3) that although this proposition was originally based on racist and colonialist presuppositions, there are non-racist and noncolonialist reasons for supporting it now, and therefore this proposition of law is
not tainted.140
But what we have not yet established is whether the “impracticable and anomalous” factors formed the Court’s justification for the Incorporation Doctrine or
note 79, at 123 (noting that “one might well view the Insular Cases as central documents in
the history of American racism”). See also Gerald Neuman, Constitutionalism and Individual
Rights in the Territories, in FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE 182, 184 (Christina Duffy Burnett
& Burke Marshall, eds., 2001) (explaining that the Insular Cases “adopted a new distinction
between ‘incorporated territories’ and ‘unincorporated territories’ for the explicit purpose of
facilitating colonial expansion”); Ramos, supra note 85, at 113.
136
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2262 (2008).
137
Burnett, supra note 5, at 984. But note that some legal scholars have taken issue with
Burnett’s interpretation of the Insular Cases as being sheep-like—rather than lion-like. See, e.g.,
EDIBERTO ROMÁN, CITIZENSHIP AND ITS EXCLUSIONS 178 n.18 (2010) (accusing Burnett’s
interpretation of the Insular Cases of being “a revisionist view of the doctrine established by
the cases”).
138
See supra Part I.B.2.a.
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See supra notes 119–20 and accompanying text.
140
See supra notes 132–37 and accompanying text.
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whether these were limiting factors that are now actually a part of the doctrine. This
distinction is extremely important for how we interpret the Incorporation Doctrine,
but its importance, as we will see, turns on controversial matters concerning the
nature of precedent.141
If the Court cited these factors to justify the Incorporation Doctrine, then the
conventional interpretation of the doctrine seems correct in holding that the Court
held that nonfundamental rights never apply in unincorporated territories. Under this
interpretation of the doctrine, the “impracticable and anomalous” reasons merely
justify the rule that nonfundamental rights do not apply in unincorporated territories.
And these reasons for the rule do not matter because the Court established a canonical rule to apply to all facts within the scope of the rule (i.e., whenever a nonfundamental right is at issue in an unincorporated territory), regardless of whether the
background justifications (i.e., the “impracticable and anomalous” reasons) for the
rule obtain in that particular case.142 But if the Court cited these factors to limit the
scope of the rule that nonfundamental rights do not apply in unincorporated territories, then it appears that the Incorporation Doctrine means that nonfundamental
rights do not apply in unincorporated territories, but only when the background conditions obtain. In other words, nonfundamental rights do not apply in unincorporated
territories only if it would be impracticable and anomalous to do so. Under this interpretation, the “impracticable and anomalous” factors are part of the rule itself.
The following subsection will explain why the latter interpretation is superior.
d. Whether the “Impracticable and Anomalous” Factors Justified or Limited
the Incorporation Doctrine
One reason for supporting the interpretation that the “impracticable and anomalous” factors limited rather than justified the Incorporation Doctrine is that to read
these factors as justifications requires that there be some relationship between a
141

This distinction between justifying reasons and limiting factors is relevant only if a
court adopts what is called in the stare decisis literature “the rules approach” to precedent,
whereby a precedent decision consists of whatever rule was articulated by the deciding court.
The distinction is not relevant if a court adopts “the results approach,” whereby a precedent decision consists of the facts that triggered the ultimate result reached by the deciding court. For
further explanation of these approaches, see LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE
OF RULES: MORALITY, RULES, AND THE DILEMMAS OF LAW 137–56 (2001) (exploring rules,
natural, and result models of precedent and concluding that the rules model is best in serving
the goals of stare decisis); Larry Alexander, Precedent, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 495–500 (Dennis Patterson ed., 2010). I believe the rules approach
to be the most defensible approach of how stare decisis does and should work in practice, but
this is a contestable and controversial claim, as will be discuss infra.
142
Again, this is based on a court adopting the rules approach to precedent and thereby holding that justifications for a rule come into play only if the deciding court did not announce
the decision clearly as a rule. See supra text accompanying note 141.
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nonfundamental right applying and the impracticability or anomalousness of it applying, and it is hard to conceive of such a relationship existing. That is, it requires us
to say that fundamental rights are more likely than nonfundamental rights to apply
in a given territory because fundamental rights are less likely to apply in an impracticable or anomalous way. But there is little to no basis for finding that there is such
a relationship, either as a matter of fact or constitutional theory.
To take the Balzac case as an example, it seems just as impracticable and anomalous to apply in Puerto Rico the fundamental guarantees provided in the Due Process
Clause as it would be to apply the nonfundamental guarantees provided in the Sixth
Amendment’s right to a jury trial. Indeed, when the Balzac case was decided, the
freedom to contract was still considered a fundamental right under the Due Process
Clause.143 Applying this freedom to contract in Puerto Rico would certainly be impracticable and anomalous, as it would require the United States to create and enforce
a libertarian economic market in the island (perhaps an impracticable task to accomplish), as well as to impose this market on the people (an anomalous economic system in a land that traditionally did not have a free market system).144
Given that it is just as impracticable and anomalous to apply fundamental rights
in a particular territory as it would be to apply nonfundamental rights in that same
territory, it does not make sense to say that nonfundamental rights do not apply
abroad because it would be impracticable and anomalous do so. Indeed, this is akin
to saying that because stopping at red lights and following speed limits are equally
inconvenient when a driver is in a rush, drivers do need to stop at red lights but do
not need to follow speed limits. This “because” does not link up the reason with the
conclusion. A “because” that would link up the reason and the conclusion, however,
would be the following proposition: because stopping at red lights is more important
to securing safety than is following speed limits, drivers do need to stop at red lights
even when it would be inconvenient to do so, but in such a circumstance they do not
need to follow speed limits. In this case, the convenience factors would not justify
the exception to the speed limit, since these factors apply equally to both stopping
at red lights and following speed limits. What would justify the exception would be
the fundamentality of the relevant requirements, with the fundamental law (the redlight requirement) overriding the convenience factors, and the nonfundamental law
(the speeding law) not being sufficiently important so as to override those factors.
In effect, then, the convenience factors would limit the scope of the speed limit
rule—i.e., the speed limit would apply except when it would be inconvenient for
drivers to follow this requirement.
143

See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). This interpretation of the Due
Process Clause was not repudiated until West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
144
For a general overview of how the United States sought to transform Puerto Rico’s
economic system, see CÉSAR J. AYALA & RAFAEL BERNABE, PUERTO RICO IN THE AMERICAN
CENTURY (2007).
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Using this example, we can see that while it does not make sense to say that
nonfundamental rights do not apply abroad because it would be impracticable and
anomalous to do so, it does make sense to say that, because nonfundamental rights
are not sufficiently important to the American constitutional scheme so as to warrant
applying them when doing so would be impracticable and anomalous, such rights do
not apply in such circumstances. By contrast, fundamental rights, due to their importance to the American constitutional scheme, apply even when it would be impracticable and anomalous to do so. In other words, the “impracticable and anomalous”
factors limit the scope of the Incorporation Doctrine rather than justify it.
Besides the logical incongruity of reading the impracticability and anomalousness factors as justifications, another objection to such a reading is that it would turn
the “impracticable and anomalous” analysis entirely on Congress’s activity (or
inactivity) with regard to incorporating a territory. This is because, under the conventional interpretation, a congressional action to incorporate a territory would be
interpreted to mean that applying the Constitution there would never be impracticable and anomalous, whereas Congress’s failure to incorporate a territory would
be interpreted to mean that applying nonfundamental guarantees there would always
be impracticable and anomalous. This would be quite a strange paradigm, because
the “impracticable and anomalous” factors function as highly narrow, subtle, and
mutable fact-sensitive inquiries, making them more appropriate for specific judicial
adjudication than general congressional determinations. That is, in inquiring into
when it is impracticable to apply a particular constitutional provision in a given
situation, the judiciary seems to be the best branch to determine the resources
necessary for implementing the provision in that land and to determine whether at
that time U.S. capabilities in that territory are up to the task. And in inquiring into
when it is anomalous to apply a particular constitutional provision in a given situation, the judiciary also seems to be the best branch to determine the fit between
a constitutional provision and the cultural tradition prevailing in that land. If the
Insular Cases treated these inquiries as foreclosed by congressional inactivity—that
is, by the lack of an affirmative congressional act incorporating a given territory—
then the reasoning would lead to absurd conclusions.
For example, this would require treating it as always impracticable and anomalous to apply the Constitution in an unincorporated land long under U.S. control,
such as Puerto Rico, even as over time it has become quite practicable and fitting to
apply the Constitution there due to the increasing presence of U.S. resources and the
infiltration of American culture and values. Given the extent to which the “impracticability and anomalousness” inquiries depend on the particular circumstances at
that time, it does not make sense to interpret the Insular Cases as holding that nonfundamental rights never apply because it would be impracticable and anomalous
to do so. Rather, the better interpretation is that nonfundamental rights do not apply
when it would be impracticable and anomalous to do so.
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For this reason, Justice Harlan seems to have been right in Reid when he proclaimed that Balzac “is not good authority for the proposition that jury trials need
never be provided for American citizens tried by the United States abroad.”145
Instead, Harlan explained, “the [Balzac] case is good authority for the proposition
that there is no rigid rule that jury trial must always be provided in the trial of an
American overseas, if the circumstances are such that trial by jury would be impractical and anomalous.”146 Here, Harlan was saying that it is not the case that nonfundamental rights do not apply abroad because doing so would be impracticable and
anomalous. Rather, it is the case, as I argued above, that nonfundamental rights do
not apply abroad when doing so would be impracticable and anomalous.147
As stated above, however, my interpretation of the Insular Cases is arguable,
turning on subtle and open-ended matters concerning the best way to treat precedent
in general and these precedents in particular. Indeed, there is a reasonable argument
that Justice Harlan incorrectly interpreted the Insular Cases because, according to
the results approach to precedent, the Insular Cases stand for the proposition that
nonfundamental rights never apply in unincorporated territories,148 thus rendering
the “impracticable” and “anomalous” considerations outside the scope of the holdings.
Although I think this interpretation is vastly inferior to the one I provided above, it is
not an unreasonable argument and indeed, some eminent scholars have suggested
that this is precisely what the Insular Cases held.149 That is, after all, why it is the conventional interpretation, and it is this conventional interpretation that has made the
Insular Cases so controversial for seeming to foreclose the transnational applicability of nonfundamental constitutional guarantees.
For those commentators who do not see the Insular Cases as adopting the
“impracticable and anomalous” standard, it will be helpful to examine how Justice
Kennedy has affirmed Justice Harlan’s interpretation of the Incorporation Doctrine.150
As will be explained below, Justice Kennedy has not made these affirmations in binding statements of law, a point that has significant implications for how we conceptualize the framework for applying the Constitution abroad, but nevertheless, Kennedy’s
non-binding invocations of the “impracticable and anomalous” standard contribute to
settling it as the critical test governing the Constitution’s transnational applicability.151
145

Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74–75 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
Id. at 75.
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See id. at 74–75.
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See SPARROW, supra note 85, at 5. Indeed, the result in each of the Insular Cases was
that the nonfundamental right at issue did not apply to the unincorporated territory, so a
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See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2255–56, 2261–62 (2008); United States
v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 277–78 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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146

2012] A CLARIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION’S APPLICATION ABROAD

195

C. The Contexts in Which Justice Kennedy Invoked the “Impracticable and
Anomalous” Standard in His Verdugo-Urquidez and Boumediene Opinions
Justice Kennedy has invoked the “impracticable and anomalous” standard twice,
the first time in his concurring opinion in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,152 and
most recently in his majority opinion in Boumediene v. Bush.153 Because some commentators and advocates have interpreted Verdugo-Urquidez as a plurality opinion,154
thus making Kennedy’s concurrence binding as the narrowest opinion of the Court,
it is important to examine this interpretation closely. Under this interpretation Justice
Kennedy may have made the “impracticable and anomalous” standard binding law
even if in Reid Justice Harlan incorrectly imputed the doctrine to the Insular Cases.
Likewise, because Kennedy’s opinion in Boumediene is quite complicated155 (to put
it nicely—muddled and inconsistent to put it less charitably), determining whether
he actually applied the “impracticable and anomalous” standard in citing it will require a close reading of his reasoning in that opinion.
1. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez
Verdugo-Urquidez arose after the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
conducted a search in Mexico of the home of Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez, a
drug lord suspected of torturing and murdering a DEA agent.156 Although the DEA
had received permission from the Mexican government for both arresting Mr.
Verdugo-Urquidez and searching his home, the DEA did not have a warrant.157 The
search yielded records of marijuana shipments, which Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez
claimed had to be excluded from his trial because the DEA had violated his Fourth
Amendment rights by failing to obtain a warrant.158 The Supreme Court upheld the
search on the ground that the Warrant Clause did not protect Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez,
a Mexican national, while he was in Mexico.159
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist began his analysis by noting
that whereas the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination “is a fundamental trial right”160 and therefore applies for any trial conducted within the United
States, the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause protects property, and therefore its
152

Id.
Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2255–56, 2261–62.
154
See Neuman, supra note 20, at 2075 n.12.
155
See Stephen I. Vladeck, Boumediene’s Quiet Theory: Access to Courts and the
Separation of Powers, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107, 2109 (2009) (describing Boumediene
as “lengthy and complex”).
156
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 262.
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Id. at 262–63.
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Id.
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Id. at 274–75.
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Id. at 264.
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applicability depends not on the location of the trial, but on where the search or seizure arises.161 The Court found the distinction important because the Warrant Clause
text is limited to “the people,”162 a term that the Court found to refer to “the People
of the United States” mentioned in the Constitution’s Preamble.163 Rehnquist used
this as a basis for opining that whereas rights that arise within the United States
apply equally to citizens and non-citizens, searches conducted abroad apply differently to citizens and non-citizens under the Warrant Clause.164
But Chief Justice Rehnquist did not rest the Court’s analysis entirely or even
principally on this distinction between citizens and non-citizens. Rather, turning
away from the Fourth Amendment text and toward the Court’s doctrine, Rehnquist
found that under the Insular Cases “[o]nly ‘fundamental’ constitutional rights are
guaranteed to inhabitants of [unincorporated] territories.”165 As a result, he concluded,
“it is not open to us in light of the Insular Cases to endorse the view that every constitutional provision applies wherever the United States Government exercises its
power.”166 Because the Court found that the Warrant Clause creates a nonfundamental right, the Court concluded that the Insular Cases foreclosed the applicability
of the Warrant Clause to the search of Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez’s home in Mexico.167
The Court thus rejected Justice Black’s plurality opinion in Reid, and instead
adopted the narrower position, taken by Justices Frankfurter and Harlan in their
concurring opinions, that nonfundamental constitutional guarantees do not always
apply to U.S. conduct abroad.168
Although Chief Justice Rehnquist did not bank the Court’s analysis on the citizenalien distinction, but rather on the well-settled Incorporation Doctrine,169 it is important to note that Chief Justice Rehnquist’s reasoning in Verdugo-Urquidez was
broader than the Insular Cases, as well as broader than Justice Harlan’s interpretation
of their central holdings. This is because Rehnquist did not suggest that the impracticability and anomalousness of applying the Warrant Clause to the search were relevant factors. Instead, Rehnquist held that the Warrant Clause did not apply at all to
searches outside of the United States.170 If one interprets the Insular Cases as holding
161

See id. at 264–66.
Id. at 265.
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Id.
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Id. at 265–66.
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Id. at 268.
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Id. at 268–69.
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Id.
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Notably, Rehnquist’s rejection of Black’s plurality opinion is consistent with the
Supreme Court’s approach to determining which opinions are binding when no opinion is
supported by a majority of the Court. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)
(holding when there is no majority opinion, the binding law is the “position taken by those
Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds” (quoting Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976))).
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Id. at 261, 267.
162

2012] A CLARIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION’S APPLICATION ABROAD

197

that nonfundamental rights do not apply in an incorporated territory only if such an
application would be impracticable and anomalous (which, as I suggested above, is
the best interpretation of the cases), then Rehnquist’s reasoning seems incompatible
with the Insular Cases, because Verdugo-Urquidez held that the Warrant Clause
never applies outside of the United States,171 regardless of whether it would be impracticable or anomalous for it to apply in that particular case.172
We can reconcile this incompatibility on the ground that the Insular Cases dealt
only with two types of territories (incorporated and unincorporated lands).173 By
contrast, the Verdugo-Urquidez case involved a third type of territory—an entirely
independent nation, Mexico, not under U.S. control.174 By considering this distinction, we can find a consistency in both form and substance between, on the one hand,
the holding in the Insular Cases that nonfundamental rights are subject to the “impracticable and anomalous” standard in unincorporated territories,175 and on the other
hand, Rehnquist’s decision in Verdugo-Urquidez that nonfundamental rights do not
apply at all in independent nations not under U.S. control.176 Indeed, as a formal
matter, the cases are consistent because the Insular Cases did not deal with territories under the sovereignty and control of other nations.177 And as a substantive matter, the cases are consistent because Verdugo-Urquidez holds that nonfundamental
rights do not apply at all to U.S. conduct in independent nations,178 thus affirming
the notion expressed in the Insular Cases that the amount of control the United
States exercises over a land is a significant factor in determining the Constitution’s
applicability to U.S. conduct in that territory.179
This interpretation of the Insular Cases is also consistent with Justice Kennedy’s
Verdugo-Urquidez concurrence, which, though joining Rehnquist’s opinion, explicitly invoked Harlan’s use in Reid of the “impracticable and anomalous” standard.180
Kennedy concluded that because “[t]he conditions and considerations of this case
would make adherence to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement impracticable and anomalous,”181 the Warrant Clause did not protect Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez
from the DEA’s search of his home.182 Justice Kennedy’s basis for finding that it
would be impracticable to apply the Warrant Clause to the DEA’s search was that
this would require the United States “to cooperate with foreign officials,” and this
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182

See id. at 273–74.
See id. (noting the difficulty of case-by-case determinations).
See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2254 (2008) (citing the Insular Cases).
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 275.
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 13 (1957).
See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 261.
See Reid, 354 U.S. at 13.
Id. at 261.
See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 304–05 (1922) (discussing the Insular Cases).
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 277–78 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 278.
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would be difficult to do, particularly as a result of “[t]he absence of local judges or
magistrates available to issue warrants.”183 And Kennedy’s basis for finding that it
would be anomalous to apply the Warrant Clause in this case was that there are
“differing and perhaps unascertainable conceptions of reasonableness and privacy
that prevail abroad.”184
Some scholars and advocates have argued that Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion
is a plurality, and not a majority, opinion because Kennedy’s explicit invocation
of the “impracticable and anomalous” standard suggests he did not agree with
Rehnquist’s reasoning that the Warrant Clause did not apply at all to the DEA’s
search.185 If this interpretation were correct, that would make Kennedy’s concurring
opinion binding law under the Supreme Court’s holding in Marks v. United States,
which provides that when there is no majority opinion, the binding law is “that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds.”186 The narrowest opinion is Kennedy’s concurrence, because whereas
Rehnquist’s opinion held that the Warrant Clause never protects non-citizens in land
not under U.S. control,187 Kennedy’s concurring opinion suggested that the Warrant
Clause protects non-citizens abroad so long as doing so would not be “impracticable
and anomalous.”188 Thus, it follows from this interpretation of Verdugo-Urquidez
that Kennedy’s, and not Rehnquist’s, opinion is binding precedent.
As I have explained elsewhere, however, I believe that this is not a faithful interpretation of the Verdugo-Urquidez decision,189 as it severely undermines the Court’s
operability as a formal institution of law.190 Indeed, to establish that Justice Kennedy
joined Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion, thus making it a majority opinion, it should
be sufficient to point to the fact that Kennedy formally submitted his vote in favor of
Rehnquist’s opinion.191 Moreover, interpreting Kennedy as not joining Rehnquist’s
opinion requires that we ignore Kennedy’s own declaration that he was joining it.
In Kennedy’s own words, “[a]lthough some explanation of my views is appropriate
183
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See Neuman, supra note 5, at 290 (characterizing Chief Justice Rehnquist’s decision in
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Return & Opposition to Cross Motion to Dismiss at 40–41 & n.52, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344
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given the difficulties of this case, I do not believe they depart in fundamental respects from the opinion of the Court, which I join.”192 It takes more than a healthy
dose of legal realism to have the audacity to find that Kennedy’s formal vote and
own words do not prove that he joined the Rehnquist opinion.
Although some advocates and scholars have displayed such audacity,193 most
courts and scholars have refused to go this far. Rather, they have acknowledged
that Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion is the majority opinion and is thus binding
precedent.194 To be sure, as a policy matter I am sympathetic with those who dislike
Rehnquist’s opinion and would therefore prefer reading Kennedy’s concurring
opinion as controlling. But this is just that—a policy preference. The legal issue has
been resolved: Rehnquist’s opinion is the majority opinion and thus must be addressed under stare decisis in the same way as any other opinion rendered by the
majority of the Court. This is the only way to read the opinion with integrity.
Given that Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion is the binding opinion and that it
modified the Insular Cases only by clarifying that they did not deal with lands entirely under the control of independent nations,195 the Verdugo-Urquidez Court largely
preserved the status of the “impracticable and anomalous” standard—i.e., as applying
to cases involving nonfundamental rights arising from U.S. actions in unincorporated lands under U.S. control.196 Importantly, however, although Justice Kennedy’s
concurring opinion is not binding and therefore did not change the framework
established by the Insular Cases, his explicit invocation of the “impracticable and
192

Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 275 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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anomalous” standard did contribute to the notion that it is settled law.197 As we will
see in the following subsection, Justice Kennedy contributed further to the settling
of the standard in Boumediene v. Bush, the most recent of the Court’s decisions on
the Constitution’s transnational applicability.198
2. Boumediene v. Bush
In Boumediene, Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, held that Section 7 of
the Military Commissions Act violated the Constitution’s Suspension Clause,199
because Section 7 eliminated the Court’s jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus petitions
filed by detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.200 In contrast to his concurring opinion
in Verdugo-Urquidez, Kennedy’s Boumediene opinion largely followed the framework established in the Insular Cases by inquiring into whether the right at issue—
the right to a habeas review—is fundamental to our constitutional scheme.201 Kennedy
found that it is indeed a fundamental right because “the writ of habeas corpus is itself an indispensable mechanism for monitoring the separation of powers.”202 And
while acknowledging the government’s national security interest in denying the detainees access to courts, Kennedy found that this could not trump the habeas right
because there was also a security interest in giving the detainees such access; in
Kennedy’s words, “[s]ecurity subsists, too, in fidelity to freedom’s first principles.”203
Moreover, Kennedy continued, not only is habeas a fundamental right because
it promotes national security, but it is also fundamental because “[c]hief among
[freedom’s first principles] are freedom from arbitrary and unlawful restraint and the
personal liberty that is secured by adherence to the separation of powers.”204 And
“[i]t is from these principles that the judicial authority to consider petitions for
habeas corpus relief derives.”205 Therefore, because habeas is fundamental to the
individual rights of the detainees, to our general security as free people, and to our
system of government, Kennedy concluded that the detainees had a constitutional
right to “the fundamental procedural protections of habeas corpus.”206
We see here how in contrast to his concurring opinion in Verdugo-Urquidez, where
Kennedy did not consider whether the Warrant Clause was fundamental before
197
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deciding to apply the “impracticable and anomalous” standard,207 in Boumediene
Kennedy was more faithful to the Insular Cases by considering whether the habeas
right is fundamental to determine which standard governs its applicability abroad.208
Kennedy’s opinion thus “reaffirm[ed] the Insular Cases,”209 as Gerald Neuman aptly
characterizes Kennedy’s reasoning.
But Justice Kennedy also departed from the Insular Cases framework in important ways. Most significantly, he moved the framework from turning on the legal
designation of the territory in question—that is, whether or not it has been incorporated through some official governmental act—to turning on whether the United
States controls or exercises exclusive jurisdiction over that land.210 Under the
Boumediene reasoning, if the United States controls an unincorporated land, a court
should treat that territory just like the Insular Cases treated an incorporated land.211
We see this in Guantanamo Bay, which, though only leased by the United States, was
completely under U.S. control.212 As Kennedy put it, “[n]o Cuban court has jurisdiction over American military personnel at Guantanamo or the enemy combatants
detained there,”213 and thus, “the United States is, for all practical purposes, answerable to no other sovereign for its acts on the base.”214 This move from the Incorporation
Doctrine’s focus on formal governmental designations to a focus on functional governmental actions is part of Kennedy’s rejection of a strictly formalist approach to
the Constitution’s transnational applicability.
Kennedy further modified the Insular Cases framework by suggesting that even
fundamental rights might not apply as forcefully in lands not under U.S. control as
they apply in lands under U.S. control.215 Indeed, Kennedy argued, if it were not the
case that “the United States is, for all practical purposes, answerable to no other
sovereign for its acts on the base . . . arguments that issuing the writ would be
‘impracticable or anomalous’ would have more weight.”216 Some commentators
207
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have interpreted this language, wrongly in my opinion, to signal that Kennedy was
applying the “impracticable and anomalous” standard in Boumediene. For example,
Christina Duffy Burnett interprets Boumediene as holding that “application of [the]
writ in Guantanamo would not be ‘impracticable or anomalous’ under present
circumstances, although it might be so under different circumstances.”217
But that is not exactly what Kennedy said. Rather, he explained that, under different circumstances, he would give these “arguments . . . more weight.”218 By saying
that in such a hypothetical situation he would give the arguments more weight, he
was not saying that under such circumstances a set of particular facts would be more
likely to exist. Instead, it appears that he was saying that he would apply a different
constitutional standard to assess whatever facts were before the Court. That is, it
seems that Kennedy was suggesting here that the key distinction is of a doctrinal
rather than factual significance.
So if the United States did not control the base, then the Court would have to
apply a different doctrine—i.e., the “impracticable and anomalous” standard—to
determine whether the detainees would be entitled to habeas in that given situation.
But Kennedy was not saying that it would be true, as a factual matter, that it would be
more impracticable and anomalous to apply habeas to that case. Rather, what Kennedy
seemed to be saying was that a different judicial doctrine would apply to such a case.
The “impracticable and anomalous” standard would apply to a case involving a fundamental right arising from U.S. action in a land not under U.S. control.
This is, of course, dictum because the Boumediene case did involve land under
U.S. control.219 But it is important dictum, in that it suggests a modification of the
Insular Cases. Recall that the Incorporation Doctrine held that fundamental rights
always apply to U.S. conduct abroad, whether in an incorporated or unincorporated
territory.220 Boumediene affirmed this as true for a territory under U.S. control (as
was the case in Boumediene),221 but indicated that a fundamental right would apply in
a territory not under U.S. control if and only if applying the fundamental right there
would not be impracticable and anomalous.222
Notably, Kennedy’s reasoning here is consistent with Rehnquist’s reasoning in
Verdugo-Urquidez that nonfundamental rights apply less forcefully in independent
nations, like Mexico, than in unincorporated territories.223 Indeed, both cases clearly
stand for the proposition that there are two factors determining when a constitutional
provision applies in a given situation: (1) whether the United States controls the
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
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territory where the claim arose, and (2) whether the claim involves a fundamental
meaning of the U.S. Constitution.224
After Boumediene, then, the framework for applying the Constitution is as follows:
If a constitutional claim arises in a land over which the United States exercises absolute control or exclusive jurisdiction, and if the court deems that the claim involves
a “fundamental meaning” of the Constitution, then the court should apply the
Constitution as it would if the claim had arisen domestically.225 And if neither of
these conditions are satisfied, then the court should not enforce the Constitution at
all.226 But if only one of these conditions is met, the court should apply the same
standard as would apply domestically unless it would be “impracticable and anomalous” to do so.227 This standard most clearly applies when a nonfundamental right
arises in a land under U.S. control, as was the scenario in the Insular Cases. But the
“impracticable and anomalous” standard less clearly applies when a fundamental
right arises in a land not under U.S. control, as this case has never directly come before the Court. Nevertheless, Kennedy’s dictum in Boumediene, and the central
principles underlying this area of the law, strongly suggest the applicability of the
“impracticable and anomalous” standard to such a case.228
As explained in the Introduction, a significant weakness in this framework is the
ambiguity in how to apply the “impracticable and anomalous” standard,229 and because of this ambiguity, many scholars who reject my interpretation of the standard
as binding precedent believe that it simply should not be adopted in the first place
by the Supreme Court.230 And even if we accept, as I believe we should, that Justice
Harlan correctly interpreted the Insular Cases to hold that nonfundamental rights
do not apply in unincorporated territories when it would be impracticable and
anomalous to do so, we still need to defend this standard as worthy of not being
224
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overruled.231 So for both those commentators who reject it as binding precedent and
those who accept it, we must establish that the “impracticable and anomalous” standard is a defensible doctrine in this area of the law, a task that requires determining
precisely what the standard means. Part II undertakes this inquiry.
II. WHAT DOES THE “IMPRACTICABLE AND ANOMALOUS” STANDARD MEAN?
Part II will explore what the “impracticable and anomalous” standard means,
and in so doing, will divide into three sections. Part II.A will explore how to interpret the “impracticable” prong; this discussion will turn on the important point that
“impracticable” is conceptually distinct from “impractical,” a point that, amazingly,
has eluded many scholars and judges, including Justice Harlan, who first explicated
the standard.232 Part II.B will examine the “anomalous” prong and the extent to which
foreign law can and should aid this analysis. Based on these discussions, Part II.C
will conclude that the standard consists of two conceptually distinct prongs and is
therefore a binary standard. Part II.C will thus explore the critical question whether
it is a disjunctive or conjunctive test.
A. What Does “Impracticable” Mean?
1. How the U.S. Supreme Court Has Applied the “Impracticable” Prong
Confusion about the meaning of “impracticable” was apparent from the first
explicit invocation of the “impracticable and anomalous” standard—i.e., Justice
231

Note though, that a standard created over 100 years ago, and affirmed in every Supreme
Court case in that area of the law through 2008, is unlikely, as a descriptive matter, to be
overruled. Indeed, many social science studies have found a strong correlation between time
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II, THE POLITICS OF PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 84 (2006). Therefore, they
conclude, “[o]ld precedents (50 + years old) are very unlikely to be overruled.” Id.
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Harlan’s concurring opinion in Reid v. Covert.233 Indeed, in that opinion, Harlan
used “impracticable” and “impractical” interchangeably.234 He used the term “impracticable” only once, when he announced:
that the basic teaching of Ross and the Insular Cases is that there
is no rigid and abstract rule that Congress, as a condition precedent
to exercising power over Americans overseas, must exercise it subject to all the guarantees of the Constitution, no matter what the
conditions and considerations are that would make adherence to
a specific guarantee altogether impracticable and anomalous.235
But in the very next sentence, he changed the term to “impractical” in explaining
that the Balzac case “is good authority for the proposition that there is no rigid rule
that jury trial must always be provided in the trial of an American overseas, if the
circumstances are such that trial by jury would be impractical and anomalous.”236
And when applying the standard later in the opinion, Harlan again used the term
“impractical,” stating that “[t]he Government . . . has made an impressive showing
that at least for the run-of-the-mill offenses committed by dependents overseas, such
a requirement would be as impractical and as anomalous as it would have been to
require [a] jury trial for Balzac in Porto Rico.”237
Harlan’s confusion of these terms is astounding, as they have quite different
meanings.238 Indeed, writing in 1926, H.W. Fowler explained in his famous A
233
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331, 368–73 (2005) [hereinafter Laughlin, Cultural Preservation]. But at least one astute
commentator has pointed out the difference between “impracticability” and “impracticality.”
See Burnett, supra note 5, at 1006, n.119 (noting that “Harlan used the two terms interchangeably, though arguably they do not mean quite the same thing (with ‘impracticable’
implying a more stringent standard, closer to impossibility, and ‘impractical’ implying a
lower one, thereby making room for considerations closer to convenience)”). Burnett,
however, does not go far enough: it is not just “arguabl[e] [that] they do not mean quite the
same thing”—they simply do not mean the same thing.
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Dictionary of Modern English Usage that “practical” and “practicable” are distinct
words, but, due to their overlapping meanings in some contexts, are often confused:
“[e]ach word has senses in which there is no fear that the other will be substituted
for it; but in other senses they come very near each other, & confusion is both natural
& common.”239 According to Fowler, “practicable means capable of being effected
or accomplished,” whereas “practical [means being] adapted to actual conditions.”240
To illustrate this distinction, Fowler offered three sentences that confuse these
words, and one of these sentences is particularly apt for our purposes: “But to
plunge into the military question without settling the Government question would
not be good sense or practicable policy; & no wise man would expect to get serviceable recruits for the Army from Ireland in this way.”241 As Fowler explains, the author
of this sentence should have said “practical” because “[t]he policy was certainly
practicable, for it was carried out,”242 and the author likely intended to say only that
this policy “was not suited to the conditions.”243 Even in this example, however, we
can see the overlap between the words, for what is impracticable (i.e., difficult) to accomplish is usually impractical (i.e., unwise or imprudent) to pursue. Given the confusion and overlapping meanings between these words, Fowler prescribed that, to add
clarity, we should say “impracticable” and “unpractical” instead of “impracticable”
and “impractical.”244 As Fowler put it, “[t]he constant confusion between practicable
& practical is a special reason for making use of im- & un- to add to the difference
in the negatives.”245 Harlan might have avoided a lot of confusion had he simply
followed A Dictionary of Modern English Usage, which, incidentally, was published
thirty-one years before the Reid decision and was widely used at that time.246
But which meaning did Harlan intend—the impracticability (i.e., difficulty) or
impracticality (i.e., imprudence) of providing jury trials abroad? Unfortunately, it
seems that Harlan was operating in that murky area, alluded to by Fowler, in which
the senses of the words largely overlap, leading many writers to confuse the words.
Indeed, to support his claim that “[t]he Government . . . has made an impressive showing that at least for the run-of-the-mill offenses committed by dependents overseas,
such a requirement would be as impractical and as anomalous as it would have been
to require [a] jury trial for Balzac in Porto Rico,”247 Harlan provided three reasons
239
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in an accompanying footnote.248 Two of these reasons relate to the impracticability
(difficulty) of extending a jury-trial right abroad for non-capital offenses, and the
third relates to both the impracticability and the impracticality (imprudence) of
doing so.249
Harlan’s first reason for not extending a general right to a jury trial abroad is
that if, to implement this right, the United States were “to try all offenses committed
by civilian dependents abroad in the United States,”250 the United States would have
to provide transportation for the defendants as well as the witnesses, which “would be
a ridiculous burden on the Government, quite aside from the problems of persuading
foreign witnesses to make the trip and of preserving evidence.”251 Moreover, Harlan
added, it is “doubtful in the extreme whether foreign governments would permit
crimes punishable under local law to be tried thousands of miles away in the United
States.”252 Here, Harlan clearly meant that providing jury trials in the United States
would be difficult; he therefore should have said that it would be impracticable.
Harlan’s second reason is that, even if the United States were to implement the
right by providing a trial in the foreign nation where the offense arose, it would still
be unbearably difficult to do so because “[i]f juries are required, the problem of jury
recruitment would be difficult”253 and “[f]urthermore, it is indeed doubtful whether
some foreign governments would accede to the creation of extraterritorial United
States civil courts within their territories.”254 Again, Harlan was referring to the difficulty of extending the right and thus should have said it would be impracticable.
But in his third reason, it seems that Harlan was referring to both the difficulty
and the imprudence of extending the right, thus muddling whether he meant that it
would be impracticable or impractical to apply the right abroad. In this third reason,
Harlan considered whether, if the United States could not implement the jury-trial
right by conducting a trial either in the United States or in the foreign nation where
the offense arose, the United States might be able to implement the right by having
a foreign court try the case with a foreign jury.255 Harlan dismissed this possibility,
however, on three grounds.256 One, “the protections granted to criminal defendants compare unfavorably with our own minimum standards.”257 Moreover, Harlan continued,
an act illegal in the United States might not be illegal under the law of the nation in
which the act arises, and this offense “thus would go completely unpunished.”258
248
249
250
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Finally, he concluded, “[a]dd to this the undesirability of foreign police carrying out
investigations in our military installations abroad, and it seems to me clear that this
alternative does not commend itself.”259 Here, Harlan was referring partly to the
impracticability of having foreign nations conduct the trials: foreign courts might
not be able to try the offenses without our procedural protections and substantive
laws. But he was also referring to the impracticality of having foreign nations conduct the trials: it would be “unfavorabl[e]”260 to have a trial without our procedural
protections, and moreover, it would be “undesirab[le]”261 to have foreign police conduct the investigation. So even if the trial would be practicable, in the sense that it
could be done without too much difficulty, it would not “commend itself,”262 as
Harlan put it. This language reveals how Harlan was thinking about this issue partly
from the perspective of a U.S. policymaker, considering whether to approve this
approach in terms of its favorability and desirability; in this passage, but only in this
passage, Harlan was right in using the word “impractical.”
As is clear from this analysis of the language in Harlan’s opinion, it is impossible to determine whether he intended the standard to be “impracticable and anomalous” or “impractical and anomalous.” Indeed, he used the word “impractical” twice
but “impracticable” only once,263 perhaps leading one to believe that he more likely
meant “impractical.” But his reasoning focused much more on impracticability, perhaps providing stronger evidence, then, that he meant “impracticable.” Then again,
his final reason did mention the impracticality of applying the right.264 Given these
inconsistencies, we simply cannot discern his intended meaning by closely reading
the text or following his reasoning. For this reason, it should not come as a surprise
that lower courts have split on whether it is the “impracticable and anomalous” or
“impractical and anomalous” standard.265
Recall, however, that Harlan invoked this standard as dictum, because the Reid
case involved a fundamental right in a land under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
United States,266 so under Harlan’s reasoning, the right was going to apply regardless of whether the government satisfied the standard. This language provides only
guidance, not binding law, on what the standard means, because as argued above,
the bindingness of the standard derives from the Insular Cases.267 And importantly,
the Insular Cases, though not explicitly using the “impracticable and anomalous”
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language, relied much more on the impracticability than impracticality of applying
the Constitution abroad.268
In the Balzac opinion, for example, Chief Justice Taft explained that the jury-trial
right did not apply in Puerto Rico because it would be too difficult to apply it there:
[t]he jury system needs citizens trained to the exercise of the responsibilities of jurors. In common-law countries centuries of
tradition have prepared a conception of the impartial attitude
jurors must assume. The jury system postulates a conscious duty
of participation in the machinery of justice which it is hard for
people not brought up in fundamentally popular government at
once to acquire.269
Indeed, the Insular Cases rarely described the impracticality of applying a particular
Constitution abroad.270 But they frequently explored the impracticability of doing
so, due to the material or cultural infrastructure that the United States would have to
create to accomplish this task.271 Since Harlan was deriving the standard from these
opinions, and since these opinions focused on impracticability much more than on
impracticality, there is a much stronger basis in this context for interpreting Harlan’s
use of the standard as referring more to impracticability than impracticality.
This is indeed how Kennedy has interpreted Harlan’s concurrence. Kennedy has
consistently used “impracticable” instead of “impractical.” In Verdugo-Urquidez,
he used the word “impracticable” twice and “impractical” zero times in announcing
the standard,272 and in Boumediene, he used the word “impracticable” three times
and “impractical” zero times in invoking the standard.273 Moreover, not only has
Kennedy used only the word “impracticable,” Kennedy’s reasoning in applying the
standard has focused much more on impracticability than on impracticality. For
example, in Verdugo-Urquidez, Justice Kennedy’s basis for finding that it would be
impracticable to apply the Warrant Clause in Mexico was that there is an “absence
of local judges or magistrates available to issue warrants,”274 and the United States
would “need to cooperate with foreign officials.”275 These factors were relevant for
Kennedy because they would make it exceedingly difficult for the Warrant Clause
268
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to apply in Mexico.276 Notably, based on Kennedy’s correct use of “impracticable” to
refer to the difficulty rather than the prudence of applying a particular constitutional
provision in a particular territory, we might infer that, as compared to Harlan’s apparent unfamiliarity with Fowler’s writings on the impracticable-impractical distinction,277 Kennedy is more acquainted with how the master legal linguist of our
time, Brian Garner, views the word “impracticable.”278 Astonishingly, however, lower
courts still occasionally get this wrong, even after Kennedy clarified in Boumediene
that the standard is based on impracticability rather than impracticality.279
2. How Lower Courts Have Applied the “Impracticable” Prong
Lower courts have regularly alternated between using the terms “impracticable”
and “impractical” in applying the standard. For example, in Al Maqaleh v. Gates,280
a case on how Boumediene applies to the Bagram Theater Internment Facility at
Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
represented the Boumediene decision as finding “that habeas review would not raise
substantial practical obstacles in the way of the military mission.”281 This, of course,
is a misrepresentation of Boumediene because, as mentioned above, the Boumediene
decision did not actually apply the “impracticable and anomalous” standard. It held
that Guantanamo Bay detainees, due to their being under the absolute control of the
United States, were entitled to fundamental constitutional protections, such as the
habeas right, regardless of whether it would be impracticable and anomalous for the
United States to extend this right to the detainees.282
More important for our purposes here, however, to the extent that the Boumediene
Court did apply the standard, the Court’s language hinged on whether applying habeas in that instance would be impracticable, not on whether doing so would be
practical,283 as the district court in Al Maqaleh incorrectly claimed.284 The district
276
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court was, therefore, wrong in basing its decision to grant habeas to some of the
petitioners on the ground that “[h]abeas review is not impractical when detainees are
held at secure military facilities.”285 To the extent that the court was right in applying
the “impracticable and anomalous” standard, it should have considered the impracticability (i.e., difficulty) of providing habeas review to the detainees held in secure
military facilities, not the impracticality (i.e., imprudence) of doing so.
Likewise, the D.C. Circuit, in reversing this decision and denying habeas to the
detainees, wrongly applied the standard, even misquoting Kennedy’s invocation of
the standard in Boumediene by converting his language from “impracticable” to
“impractical.”286 Indeed, according to the D.C. Circuit, Kennedy proclaimed that had
the United States not exercised control over Guantanamo, then “arguments that
issuing the writ would be ‘impractical or anomalous’ would have more weight.”287
But as explained supra, Kennedy instead wrote that in such a situation “arguments
that issuing the writ would be ‘impracticable or anomalous’ would have more
weight.”288 In fact, as explained supra, Kennedy has never used the word “impractical”
in applying the standard. To the contrary, Kennedy has consistently used “impracticable” in both his Verdugo-Urquidez and Boumediene opinions.289 The D.C. Circuit’s
misquote provides striking evidence of the profound terminological confusion that
has pervaded this area of the law since Harlan’s conflation of the terms in Reid.
Furthering the confusion, the two most prominent pre-Boumediene lower court
cases applying the “impracticable and anomalous” standard also misapplied the impracticability analysis. The first of these cases was King v. Morton,290 a case that
arose in the unincorporated territory of the American Samoa.291 The case involved
what Harlan would have called a run-of-the-mill criminal case—a prosecution of a
U.S. citizen and resident of American Samoa for willfully failing to pay his income
taxes, in violation of Samoan law.292 After a Samoan court rejected his demand for a
jury trial, he brought his case in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia,293
which dismissed his claim for lack of jurisdiction.294 He then appealed to the D.C.
Court of Appeals, which reversed the district court and remanded the case back to
that court so that it could apply the proper standard in determining whether to extend
a jury trial.295
285
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Id. (quoting Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2261–62) (emphasis added).
288
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This standard turned on the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation of Harlan’s Reid
concurrence.296 Indeed, the D.C. Circuit found that the critical inquiry was whether
it would be “impractical and anomalous” to provide a jury trial in this instance.297 But
despite using the word “impractical” in announcing the standard, the D.C. Circuit
focused on the impracticability of applying a jury trial in the American Samoa. The
critical question for the court was “whether a jury in Samoa could fairly determine
the facts of a case in accordance with the instructions of the court without being unduly influenced by customs and traditions of which the criminal law takes no notice;
and whether the implementation of a jury system would be practicable.”298 In this
sentence, not only did the court correctly cite the word “practicable,” but it also correctly applied this word by referring to its analysis later in the opinion discussing
whether it would be possible to implement the right, given U.S. resources in the area
and the customs of Samoan jurors.299 In the very next sentence, however, the court incorrectly summarized its analysis by quoting Harlan’s use of the word “impractical.”300
In the court’s words, “[i]n short, the question is whether in American Samoa ‘circumstances are such that trial by jury would be impractical and anomalous.’”301 Again,
Harlan’s confusion looms like a specter over judicial attempts to clarify the standard.
Similarly, in Wabol v. Villacrusis,302 the next major lower court case invoking
the standard, the Ninth Circuit cited Harlan’s “impractical and anomalous” language
to determine whether a provision in the Northern Mariana Islands (NMI) Constitution
violated the Equal Protection Clause by “restrict[ing] the acquisition of long-term
interests to persons of Northern Mariana Islands descent.”303 The court proclaimed
that the question was whether this right to acquire property free from governmental
race-based classifications “is one which would be impractical or anomalous in
NMI.”304 The court found that it would not be “impractical” because:
[t]he land alienation restrictions are properly viewed as an attempt, albeit a paternalistic one, to prevent the inhabitants from
296

Id. at 1155–56 (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74–75, 77 (1957) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
297
Id. at 1147 (citing Reid, 354 U.S. at 75, 77 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
298
Id. (emphasis added).
299
In the next paragraph, the D.C. Circuit considered the American Samoa’s claim that it
would be impracticable for the U.S. government to set up jury trials in the American Samoa because the Samoan chiefs would exercise too much influence over jurors and moreover, it would
be difficult for the system to work, given the kinship among the people. Id. at 1147–48. The
court rejected this argument, but as Laughlin notes, this was not because the argument was not
conceptually sound, but rather “because the American Samoa government failed to prove the factual premises upon which it was based.” Laughlin, Cultural Preservation, supra note 238, at 353.
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King, 520 F.2d at 1147 (quoting Reid, 354 U.S. at 75 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
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selling their cultural anchor for short-term economic gain, thereby protecting local culture and values and preventing exploitation of the inexperienced islanders at the hands of resourceful
and comparatively wealthy outside investors.305
Therefore, the court concluded, “free alienation is impractical in this situation not
because it would not work, but because it would work too well.”306
Although the Ninth Circuit wrongly relied on Harlan’s “impractical” language,
because, as explained supra, the best reading of Harlan’s opinion is that it referred to
the impracticability of applying the Constitution abroad,307 at least the Ninth Circuit
applied the term consistently with its meaning. Indeed, the court properly distinguished between whether applying a right will work (its practicability) and whether,
as a policy matter, we want it to work that way (its practicality). The court wrongly
invoked the latter concept, but at least it consistently and correctly applied the term
“impractical” to the facts by considering the prudence of applying the Equal Protection Clause in NMI.
Not all courts, however, have misstated or misapplied the standard. For example,
before the Boumediene decision, the District Court for the District of Columbia, in
In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases,308 found that the critical question in determining
whether the detainees are entitled to some type of adjudicatory proceedings is whether
it would be “impracticable and anomalous” for the United States to extend such proceedings in Guantanamo.309 The court properly derived this standard from the Insular
Cases, Harlan’s Reid concurrence, and Kennedy’s Verdugo-Urquidez concurrence.
The court found that it would not be impracticable to apply the Due Process Clause
to detainees held at Guantanamo Bay, because “[r]ecognizing the existence of that
right at the Naval Base would not cause the United States government any more hardship than would recognizing the existence of constitutional rights of the detainees
had they been held within the continental United States.”310 This focus on governmental hardship is the proper model for analyzing the “impracticable” prong, as
discussed below.
3. How Courts Should Now Apply the “Impracticable” Prong
The D.C. District Court’s decision in In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases is the
model for how courts should now apply the “impracticable” prong, and moreover,
305

Id.
Id. at 1462 n.21 (emphasis added) (citing Laughlin, Application of the Constitution,
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how courts should have applied the Supreme Court’s pre-Boumediene precedents
on the Constitution’s transnational applicability. Indeed, the district court properly
began its analysis by considering whether the right at issue was fundamental.311 The
court then properly applied the “impracticable and anomalous” standard,312 because
before Boumediene, the question was not whether the United States functionally
exercised control, but rather whether the territory was formally incorporated into the
United States through some official governmental action.313 Since Guantanamo Bay
had not been so incorporated and that is the action that the pre-Boumediene cases
required for full constitutional applicability of fundamental rights,314 the district
court properly found that the “impracticable and anomalous” standard applied to this
case.315 Finally, using the word “impracticable,” the court correctly applied it to refer
to the hardship of applying the right in Guantanamo Bay (the practicability) rather
than the policy wisdom of doing so (the practicality).316
Importantly, the district court did not question whether it would be possible in
theory to apply the Constitution in that instance.317 Rather, the court considered the
hardships in practice of applying the Constitution in Guantanamo Bay.318 The court
properly focused on practice rather than theory because the Constitution must not
be interpreted to require the government to do what it, as a matter of fact, cannot do,
even if such governmental action would be theoretically possible in some conceivable situations; this is, of course, a basic idea underlying any legal scheme.319
Moreover, since it is at least theoretically possible to apply almost any constitutional
provision abroad, interpreting “impracticable” in this broad way would not reflect
the Court’s invocation of the standard to express that nonfundamental rights do not
always apply abroad. Indeed, such a broad interpretation would effectively adopt
Justice Black’s position in his Reid plurality opinion that the government must obey
the Constitution whenever and wherever it acts abroad320—an approach that the
Court has clearly and repeatedly rejected.321
The question, rather, is whether it would be possible, given the relevant foreignpolicy mission and the means readily available to the United States in pursuing that
mission, to apply the Constitution in that instance. To illustrate this, let us apply the
“impracticability” prong to the recent controversy over the transnational applicability
311
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of the Establishment Clause. As I mentioned in the Introduction to this Article,322
and as I have discussed at length in a previous work, there has been considerable
debate over this issue largely as a result of the USAID Inspector General’s Office
July 17, 2009, audit questioning whether some of USAID’s programs violate the
Establishment Clause.323 In particular, the audit report questions the constitutionality of USAID’s funding of the repair of Iraqi mosques and funding of an African
HIV/AIDS program infused with religious messages.324
Assuming that the “impracticable and anomalous” standard applied in these
instances,325 the question, as far as the “impracticable” prong is concerned, would
be whether the United States, given its presence in Iraq and these specific countries
in Africa, is capable of accomplishing the relevant foreign-policy mission.
So the first task is to identify that mission. In funding mosques in Iraq, the relevant policy mission seems to be to stabilize the area. Indeed, the audit report explains
that “some of the expected benefits from rehabilitating the Al Shuhada Mosque were
stimulating the economy, enhancing a sense of pride in the community, reducing
opposition to international relief organizations operating in Fallujah, and reducing
incentives among young men to participate in violence or insurgent groups.”326
The next inquiry is whether, given the U.S. presence in these lands, the United
States is capable of accomplishing that mission while enforcing the Establishment
Clause constraints on funding religion. The answer for the funding in Iraq seems to
be “yes.” To stimulate the economy and enhance a sense of pride in the community,
so as to stabilize the region, the United States could fund the repair of many types of
buildings besides inherently religious ones; for example, the United States is capable
of achieving this task in Iraq by funding community centers and secular schools.327
So it seems entirely practicable to apply the Establishment Clause to this funding of
mosques in Iraq. Note, however, that although it seems practicable, it might not be
practical to do so, since it is possible that by having a court impose the Establishment
Clause on this funding so as to cease the funding of these mosques, it would stir up
hostility against American secularism, thus furthering the notion among Islamic
322
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radicals that the United States is a nation of heathens.328 Of course, it would be impractical (i.e., imprudent) to enforce the Constitution in a way that encourages this
impression of the United States in the Middle East. So if practicality were the factor,
then it would fail this prong, whereas it would satisfy the practicability prong so that
the Establishment Clause would apply to the program.329 This further illustrates the
importance of distinguishing between impracticability and impracticality in applying
the “impracticable and anomalous” standard.
The African HIV/AIDS program, however, might fail the impracticability prong
so that the Establishment Clause would not apply, though this is far from certain
based on the available facts. In analyzing this case, the first question, just as in the
Iraq example, is to identity the relevant foreign-policy mission. Here, the mission
seems to be, as the audit report explains, “to improv[e] the self-awareness and selfworth of young people so that students of the program might become less vulnerable
to sexual exploitation and thus less at risk for HIV.”330
The next question is whether, given the U.S. presence in these regions of Africa,
the United States is capable of accomplishing this mission while also enforcing the
Establishment Clause prohibition on mixing religious doctrine with such lessons
on sex education.331 USAID officials have argued that because “the cultural context
in which the curriculums would be used is markedly different from that in the
United States . . . such religious references are useful for connecting with the target
audience,”332 and therefore, “the use of religious references can improve the effectiveness of an activity’s nonreligious purpose, such as preventing the spread of HIV.”333
In conducting this part of the analysis, it is important to note that USAID’s claims
are quite tentative—it alleges that the use of religion in this context is “useful” and
“can improve the effectiveness” of the mission.334 This seems to suggest that it is
impractical to apply the Establishment Clause to the program. But, it does not establish that it is impracticable to do so. Indeed, this is a much higher standard that
will require a fact-specific inquiry into the particular U.S. resources available in the
land in question and whether the people in that land actually seem capable of acquiring a sex education on these particular subjects without the use of such overtly Christian references. Since the audit report does not provide any facts on these issues,335
328
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it is unclear whether applying the Establishment Clause to this program would
be impracticable.
Our analyses of the Iraqi and African cases demonstrate how practicality will
ultimately turn on a judgment about the desirability of the underlying policy, whereas
practicability will turn on a significantly more circumscribed and technical judgment about the possibility of applying a particular constitutional provision abroad.
This more circumscribed and technical judgment is a much more legally defensible
task for a judge to perform. And as argued at length above, this approach is much
more consistent with the “impracticable and anomalous” standard as it was implied
in the Insular Cases, derived by Justice Harlan in Reid, and affirmed by Justice
Kennedy in Verdugo-Urquidez and Boumediene. Now that we have established the
meaning of “impracticable” in the standard, we can turn to our second task in
discerning the standard, the meaning of “anomalous” in this context.
B. What Does “Anomalous” Mean?
Our inquiry into the meaning of “anomalous” in this context must begin, as did
our investigation into “impracticable,” with the first explicit invocation of the
standard: Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Reid.
1. How the U.S. Supreme Court Has Applied the “Anomalous” Prong
Unfortunately, just as he failed to distinguish between “impracticable” and
“impractical,” Harlan also failed to distinguish “anomalous” from either of these
terms. Indeed, as mentioned above, he applied his “impracticable and anomalous”
standard only in a footnote and all three reasons he provided turned not on the
anomalousness but on the impracticability (and impracticality) of extending jury
trials to “run-of-the-mill offenses” committed abroad.336 Harlan seemed to view the
“anomalous” prong as simply part of the “impracticable” prong.
Harlan’s conflation of these prongs is quite peculiar, given that the word “anomalous” is quite distinct from both the words “impracticable” and “impractical.” As
explained at length above, “impracticable” refers to the difficulty of accomplishing
something and “impractical” refers to the wisdom of pursuing something. By contrast, “anomalous” means something entirely different: it means to be “inconsistent
with or deviating from what is usual, normal, or expected.”337
But what does it mean for the Constitution to apply in a way that is “inconsistent
with or deviating from what is usual, normal, or expected”? It seems to refer to
policies and procedures for awards to faith-based and community organizations in accordance with the principles contained in Executive Order 13279?” Id.
336
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74–76 & n.12 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring). See also
supra text accompanying notes 248–64.
337
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 47 (10th ed. 1993).
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whether, given the particular circumstances surrounding the application of a constitutional right in a particular territory, a person in that territory could reasonably
expect its application there—i.e., whether it would be “usual, norm, or expected” for
the right to apply there under the prevailing cultural and legal tradition. This part of
the standard, therefore, seems to have more to do with the cultural tradition prevailing
in the land in which the right would apply, than with the difficulty imposed on the
United States in being subject to the right in that land.338 Whereas the “impracticable”
prong considers what applying the right would mean for the United States, the “anomalous” prong considers what applying the right would mean for the people residing
in the nation or territory in which that right would apply. The two terms are thus
quite distinct and deal with very different concerns.
This meaning of “anomalous” is consistent with the Insular Cases. For example,
as mentioned above, the Court held unanimously in Balzac that even if it were practicable to apply the jury-trial right in Puerto Rico, perhaps by training people how
to think and act as jurors, the Court still should not extend the right there because
doing so would be destructive of the cultural tradition that had prevailed in that land.
As the Court put it:
Congress has thought that a people like the Filipinos, or the
Porto Ricans, trained to a complete judicial system which knows
no juries, living in compact and ancient communities, with definitely formed customs and political conceptions, should be
permitted themselves to determine how far they wish to adopt
this institution of Anglo-Saxon origin, and when.339
So although Harlan did not explicitly apply the “anomalous” part of the standard
in his Reid concurrence, it seems that he was right in deriving it from the Insular
Cases, as those decisions paid significant attention to the impact that applying a right
abroad would have on the indigenous culture. And as mentioned earlier, although
the Insular Cases certainly applied this standard in a way that displayed racist overtones, there are of course non-racist bases for not applying the Constitution abroad
in a way that would undermine and weaken other cultural traditions. Indeed, there
is nothing racist about requiring courts to be culturally sensitive in how they apply
the Constitution abroad. The racist overtones underlying the Insular Cases, therefore,
do not contaminate the “anomalous” prong.340
Furthermore, Justice Kennedy, in his concurrence in Verdugo-Urquidez and majority opinion in Boumediene, has settled that the “anomalous” prong is a distinct part
of the standard, and in so doing, he has clarified its meaning. In Verdugo-Urquidez,
338
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in applying the “impracticable and anomalous” standard, Kennedy explained that
the Warrant Clause did not apply to the search in question, due to, among other
reasons, “the differing and perhaps unascertainable conceptions of reasonableness
and privacy that prevail abroad.”341 On first glance, this language might seem to
refer to the content of the right in question rather than to the application of the
“anomalous” prong, because the focus on different “conceptions of reasonableness
and privacy” can be interpreted to refer to the expectations of privacy central to the
Court’s Fourth Amendment doctrine.342 But these factors determine only whether
a search has been performed, thereby triggering the Warrant Clause’s requirements.
And whether there had been a search was not at issue in this case: the DEA officials
had clearly searched Mr. Verdugo-Urquidez’s home.343 Moreover, the Court’s standard for determining what constitutes a search does not turn on the idiosyncrasies
of a culture, but rather on whether a person’s subjective expectation of privacy is
consistent with that of an objectively reasonable person.344 Kennedy’s reference,
then, to “the differing and perhaps unascertainable conceptions of reasonableness
and privacy that prevail abroad,”345 seems to refer not to the content of the Fourth
Amendment but to the fact that it would be anomalous to require DEA officials to
secure a warrant in Mexico, a land in which there is no cultural or legal tradition of
limiting government searches in this way.
Kennedy’s majority opinion in Boumediene also suggested that the “anomalous”
factor refers to the fit between applying a particular constitutional right in a particular region and the culture prevailing in that land. As indicated above, although many
commentators have interpreted the Boumediene opinion to apply the “impracticable
and anomalous” standard,346 even though the case involved a fundamental right and a
land under U.S. control, I think a better interpretation is that the Court did not apply
the standard, given the presence of these two factors.347 Supporting this interpretation is that the Court did not actually consider whether it would be impracticable
or anomalous to apply habeas abroad; rather, the Court based its decision principally on the grounds that habeas is a fundamental right and the United States
controls Guantanamo.348
341

United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 278 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id.
343
Id. at 262–63 (majority opinion).
344
See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
345
See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 278 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
346
See Marc. D. Falkoff & Robert Knowles, Bagram, Boumediene, and Limited Government, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 851, 871 (2010) (declaring that “Boumediene marked the triumph
of a particular approach: the ‘impracticable and anomalous’ test”); Geltzer, supra note 194,
at 765–73 (explaining that commentators have offered five different interpretations of
Boumediene and the separation-of-powers and “impracticable and anomalous” tests are the
two perspectives “most likely to be vindicated in future case law”).
347
See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2256, 2261–62 (2008).
348
Id. at 2239, 2244.
342

220

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 21:171

Nevertheless, although the Court did not apply the “impracticable and anomalous”
standard in a rigorous way, the Court did mention that “[t]here is no indication . . .
that adjudicating a habeas corpus petition would cause friction with the host government.”349 This observation might be read as providing support for the important
claim that the United States functionally exercised control over Guantanamo, and
this language can also be interpreted as providing evidence of the practicability of
applying the right there. But it also can be interpreted as evidence of it not being
anomalous to apply the right in Guantanamo because there is no conflicting authority
governing that territory, thus further suggesting that the “anomalous” prong refers to
the fit between a constitutional right and the tradition prevailing in the land in which
the claim arose.
To be sure, this was an oblique reference, at best, to the anomalousness of
applying the habeas right to Guantanamo, and for this reason I believe that the best
interpretation of Boumediene is that the Court did not apply the standard. But to the
extent that the Court did apply the standard, the reference does provide some indication of how the Court views the standard as turning on the fit between the constitutional right and the cultural tradition of the land in question. As we will see below,
lower courts have been clearer about what the “anomalous” prong means.
2. How Lower Courts Have Applied the “Anomalous” Prong
Whereas lower courts have inconsistently applied the “impracticable” prong,
they have been largely consistent in how they have applied the “anomalous” prong.350
For example, in applying the standard in the King case, the D.C. Circuit declared
that “it must be determined whether the Samoan mores and matai culture with its
strict societal distinctions will accommodate a jury system in which a defendant is
tried before his peers.”351 By this, the court was referring to American Samoa’s
argument that jury trials would undermine its tradition of deferring to the judgment
of the Samoan chiefs, and moreover, the tradition’s rejection of an adversarial adjudicatory process.352 The D.C. Circuit thus interpreted the anomalous prong to turn
on the fit between the constitutional right and the tradition prevailing in the land in
which the claim arose.
Likewise, the Ninth Circuit in the Wabol 353 case found that in determining whether
it would be impracticable and anomalous to apply the Equal Protection Clause to the
NMI’s ethnic restrictions on the alienation of property, the court had to consider
“the vital role native ownership of land plays in the preservation of NMI social and
349
350
351
352
353
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Id. at 1147.
Id. at 1148.
Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1990).

2012] A CLARIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION’S APPLICATION ABROAD

221

cultural stability.”354 Moreover, the court continued, “land is principally important
in the Commonwealth not for its economic value but for its stabilizing effect on the
natives’ social system.”355 The court thus concluded that “[i]t would truly be anomalous to construe the equal protection clause to force the United States to break its
pledge to preserve and protect NMI culture and property.”356 Just like the D.C. Circuit
in King, the Ninth Circuit in Wabol focused its analysis of the “anomalous” prong
on the relationship between the right in question and the cultural tradition where the
claim arose.
Similarly, in In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, the District Court for the District
of Columbia also focused on the fit between applying a constitutional right in a land
and the cultural tradition prevailing in that territory.357 As explained above, this case
is in many ways a model for how courts should analyze the Constitution’s transnational applicability under the Supreme Court’s framework.358 Indeed, the district
court correctly applied the “impracticable” prong, and it did the same with the
“anomalous” prong, concluding that it would not be anomalous to extend habeas to
Guantanamo because “there are few or no significant remnants of native Cuban
culture or tradition remaining that can interfere with the implementation of an
American system of justice.”359
As this discussion illustrates, there is a consistent line stemming from the Insular
Cases and extending for the most part unbroken and unaltered through Boumediene,
holding that it would be anomalous to apply a constitutional provision in a land if
and only if there would be an inconsistency between that application and the cultural tradition prevailing in that land. But although there is generally a consensus on
the meaning of “anomalous” in this context, there is not a consensus on how to
implement this meaning. That is, how should courts go about determining when there
is such an inconsistency? What are our data points for determining whether there is
an inconsistency?
Thus far, courts generally have made this determination on the basis of general
observations of the culture of the people dominating the land in question,360 but this
approach has serious drawbacks. As evidenced in the Insular Cases, racism and
paternalism might underlie a judge’s free-wheeling judgment about whether a group
is “fit” for a particular constitutional guarantee.361 And even if this is not as much
354
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of a concern in the 21st century, we still should be reluctant to turn a constitutional
analysis on the cultural practices of a group of people, a task much better suited for
an anthropologist than a judge. We, therefore, need some distinctly legal methodology to circumscribe the scope of the “anomalous” prong analysis.
As mentioned in the Introduction, Gerald Neuman has offered an interesting
method of resolving this issue, but although Neuman’s method avoids the problem
of making judges anthropologists, it introduces perhaps even more significant
defects into the standard.
3. How Courts Should Now Apply the “Anomalous” Prong
a. Gerald Neuman’s Proposal: Its Strengths and Weaknesses
Instead of turning to culture, Neuman proposes turning to international humanrights law.362 According to Neuman, “One form of anomalous consequence that
weighs against the extraterritorial application of a constitutional right under the functional approach is the cultural inappropriateness of a distinctive U.S. right in foreign
territories.”363 And consulting “international human rights standards can aid the Court
in recognizing norms that are widely shared, so that insisting on their inclusion in
the terms of cooperation is less likely to cause friction with foreign governments,
and foreign populations have more of an expectation that they will be observed.”364
There are three significant weaknesses in Neuman’s approach. One problem is
that it consults international law to determine the meaning of the U.S. Constitution,
an approach that many constitutional scholars and judges condemn as illegitimate.365
This issue, of course, stirred up controversy after Justice Kennedy cited a foreign
case in justifying his decision in Lawrence v. Texas to invalidate sodomy bans as
violating the Due Process Clause.366 Following the Lawrence decision, several Representatives introduced resolutions on November 18 and 21, 2003, forbidding the
Supreme Court to “consider” or “look for guidance” to any foreign laws or opinions,
even in decisions not involving the U.S. Constitution.367 The following year, this
362

See Note, The Extraterritorial Constitution and the Interpretive Relevance of International Law, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1908 (2008), for similar but distinct proposals to consult
international law in applying the standard; see also J. Andrew Kent, A Textual and Historical
Case Against a Global Constitution, 95 GEO. L.J. 463, 540 (2007).
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Neuman, supra note 5, at 277.
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See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Lawrence, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Supreme
Court’s Reliance on Foreign Constitutional Law: An Originalist Reappraisal, 65 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1097 (2004).
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539 U.S. 558, 576–77 (2003) (citing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H. R.
(1981)).
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See H.R. Res. 468, 108th Cong. (2003); Constitutional Preservation Resolution, H.R.
Res. 446, 108th Cong. (2003).
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prohibition was narrowed in bills and resolutions forbidding judges to consult foreign law only in decisions interpreting the U.S. Constitution.368
In 2005, however, in Roper v. Simmons,369 Justice Kennedy again consulted
foreign law in his opinion for the Court,370 drawing the ire of Justice Scalia, who inveighed against the opinion on the ground that “[t]o invoke alien law when it agrees
with one’s own thinking, and ignore it otherwise, is not reasoned decisionmaking,
but sophistry.”371 Justice Scalia’s rejoinder inspired further Senate and House resolutions enjoining the use of foreign law in interpreting the U.S. Constitution.372
Now it has become a standard in the Confirmation Hearings for Senators to question
nominees about their views on the issue.373
Seeking to sidestep this debate, Neuman claims that his approach does not
involve using foreign law to interpret the U.S. Constitution, because taking international human-rights norms “into account in the application of the functional approach would not involve the importation of foreign values into the constitutional
system as constraints on our government.”374 Rather, Neuman holds that in applying
his framework, “the Court would be enforcing U.S. constitutional values in circumstances where the international background helped make extraterritorial compliance
more feasible.”375 Thus, Neuman contends that his proposal is about efficaciously
applying the Constitution abroad, not importing foreign law into our system.
But contrary to Neuman’s assurances, his approach does seem to involve importing foreign values into the American constitutional system, since Neuman is essentially arguing for courts to find that the U.S. Constitution applies abroad in lockstep
with international human-rights norms. Neuman contests that this is just a matter of
compliance, not importation,376 but it is not clear how compliance would be made
more feasible by the mere fact that there is an international norm out there that the
United States is allegedly violating. Indeed, it might very well be that if the United
States is violating that norm, it is doing so in a country that also repudiates it, thus
making the violation quite feasible to accomplish.
Consider, for example, if the United States were to seek to prove its respect for
Islam by banning or severely restricting the practice of all non-Islamic faiths in
368
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American Citizens Act, H.R. 4118, 108th Cong. (2004) was introduced on April 1, 2004, by
Rep. Ron Paul (R-TX).
369
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Iraq. Such action would of course violate international human-rights law, because
although there is no international disestablishment norm, there is such a free-exercise
norm, as expressed in Article 18 of both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights377
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.378 Nevertheless, despite
the existence of this international free-exercise norm, it would be quite feasible to restrict the practice of non-Islamic faiths in Iraq, because even though various provisions
of the recently enacted Iraqi Constitution guarantee the free exercise of religion,379
it still might be the case that the prevailing cultural tradition of the land would make
it easy for the government to effectuate such a ban. Indeed, a majority-Muslim nation still accustomed to the ways of Saddam Hussein’s oppressive regime would seem
unlikely to rebel against restrictions on the practice of non-Islamic faiths.
To illustrate further how Neuman’s approach seems to involve the importation
of international norms into the American constitutional order, let us consider another
hypothetical example, one involving a trial in Iraq when the United States still
controlled the nation’s legal proceedings. A judge following Neuman’s approach
would be at greater liberty to find that it is unconstitutional for the United States to
seek the death penalty abroad than if such an action were taken domestically, because in light of the growing consensus in the international community against the
377

“Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right
includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community
with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice,
worship and observance.” Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (III),
U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (Dec. 10, 1948).
378
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion
or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or
belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom
to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.
3. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to
such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect
public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect
for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity
with their own convictions.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 18, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
379
Articles 14, 41, 43, Section 2, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [the Constitution of the
Republic of Iraq] of 2005.
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death penalty, there is a plausible argument that the death penalty violates international human-rights norms, at least for anything but the most serious crimes.380
Indeed, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights forbids the death
penalty, except “for the most serious crimes,”381 and moreover, it absolutely forbids
the death penalty even for the most serious crimes if they were committed by certain
classes of persons, such as minors and pregnant women.382 So an American judge
who opposed the death penalty could easily harness Neuman’s approach to forbid
the United States to use capital punishment in certain types of cases abroad, such as
cases that are not sufficiently serious under international law to warrant the death
penalty, even if that punishment might not clearly be impermissible domestically
under the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. As a result, we would
have stricter constitutional standards applying abroad than to U.S. domestic conduct,
a dissonance that likely would lead to the stricter standards migrating into the Court’s
domestic jurisprudence. Whatever the policy merits of such an approach, it clearly
involves using international law to interpret the meaning of the U.S. Constitution.
This approach is thus quite problematic for those scholars and judges who find it
inappropriate to interpret the content of the U.S. Constitution according to international norms.
A second problem in his approach is that it seems to permit too many actions
that are repugnant not only to our Constitution but also to many constitutions throughout the world. A recent case, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama,383 illustrates how this is so.
The Al-Aulaqi case involves a challenge to the legality of the Obama Administration’s efforts to kill Anwar Al-Aulaqi, a senior talent recruiter for al-Qaeda.384 In
2010, Al-Aulaqi’s father brought the suit against the President, the Secretary of
380

It should be noted that, in signing the I.C.C.P.R., the United States specified that it
reserved the right to use the death penalty on any person—including minors but not pregnant
women—validly convicted within its jurisdiction. 138 CONG. REC. S4783 (daily ed. Apr. 2,
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penalty in the United States might violate international law because there is an emerging international norm against all forms of the death penalty. For elaboration of this argument, see
WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
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(1993); William A. Schabas, International Law, Politics, Diplomacy and the Abolition of
the Death Penalty, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RIGHTS J. 417 (2004); Avinash Samarth, The
U.S. Death Penalty: An International Human Rights Wrong, ACLU BLOG OF RTS. (Apr. 21,
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Defense, and the Director of the CIA on the grounds that they violated the U.S.
Constitution, as well as international human-rights law, by not seeking a court order
before proceeding with their attempts to kill Al-Aulaqi.385 The U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction on the ground
that Al-Aulaqi’s father did not have standing to bring the claim.386 In so ruling, however, the court mentioned that “there is no basis for the assertion that the threat of
a future state-sponsored extrajudicial killing—as opposed to the commission of a
past state-sponsored extrajudicial killing—constitutes a tort in violation of the ‘law
of nations.’”387 Following the ruling, the United States finally succeeded in killing
Al-Aulaqi with targeted Hellfire missiles on September 30, 2011.388
This case demonstrates how difficult it is to establish that very serious constitutional violations—such as the threat of an imminent deprivation of life without due
process—rise to the level of an international human-rights norm. Under Neuman’s
approach, then, a court would likely find that applying this right in Yemen, or in any
other country, would be anomalous simply because it is not an international human
right. This would permit the U.S. government to commit violations of the U.S. Constitution that, though not violating international human-rights law, are nevertheless
quite serious. Indeed, as the Al-Aulaqi case demonstrates, government threats of an
imminent deprivation of life without due process do not rise to a violation of international human-rights law, even though such governmental machinations strike at
the core of fundamental guarantees of legal process.
A third serious problem in Neuman’s approach is that it undermines the entire
purpose of the “anomalous” prong—i.e., to respect the legal and cultural tradition
prevailing in the particular land where the claim has arisen. Consider, for example,
USAID’s funding of mosques, discussed above.389 Very few nations provide for the
robust separation of religion and government guaranteed by the First Amendment’s
Establishment Clause,390 and for this reason, there is clearly not an international
human-rights norm against the government’s funding of religion. Nevertheless, the
idea of the United States funding religion abroad is quite troubling not only for
many American taxpayers, but also for many people in the countries where that funding might take place.391 Neuman’s standard would ignore this because it would focus
only on those rights that have developed such global approval that they have become
international norms. Indeed, Neuman’s proposed approach of looking to international human-rights standards would seem to require the U.S. Constitution to apply
385
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with equal force wherever international human-rights norms are applicable. As a
result, this approach would treat the funding of mosques in Iraq, a country that has
an established religion, the same way as the funding of mosques in France, a country
that requires a strict separation of religion and government.392 In both cases, Neuman
would seem to find it anomalous to impose American-style disestablishmentarianism
on USAID’s funding of religion, because disestablishment is not an international
human-rights norm. This completely undermines the “anomalous” prong’s focus on
the particular tradition of the land in question.
As will be explained below, I believe that a better analytical guide than international human-rights law is the constitution of the country in question.393 Such an
approach would promote all of the strengths of Neuman’s proposal by ensuring that
judges apply the “anomalous” prong by consulting legal rather than anthropological
materials, but it would do so without raising any of the three problems identified
above in Neuman’s approach. Although my proposal also has defects, in particular
the interpretive problems that it raises,394 I believe that these weaknesses pale in
comparison to the ones enumerated above.
b. My Proposal: Its Strengths and Weaknesses
I propose that courts consult the constitution of the land where the claim arose
to determine whether it would be anomalous to apply the particular U.S. constitutional provision there. We can see hints of such an approach in the D.C. Circuit’s
decision in the King case, where the court found that determining whether it would
be “impractical395 and anomalous” to apply a jury trial in American Samoa must “rest
on a solid understanding of the present legal and cultural development of American
Samoa.”396 In her recent article, Burnett scrutinizes the D.C. Circuit’s reasoning and
questions how “a federal court [could] acquire ‘a solid understanding of the present
legal and cultural development of American Samoa.’”397 Burnett notes how, “on
remand the district court . . . took up the appointed task with earnest diligence, [by]
examining and explaining the details of Samoan culture.”398 Burnett concludes that
this unlimited judicial “foray into Samoan culture” illustrates how the “impracticable
and anomalous” standard is one of paramount “malleability.”399
392
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As mentioned above, I share Burnett’s skepticism of having judges base their
legal judgments on anthropological observations, but I disagree with Burnett that
such observations are required to implement the “impracticable and anomalous” test.
I also disagree that the D.C. Circuit’s opinion called for the district court to make
these observations on remand. The D.C. Circuit ordered the district court simply to
consider the “present legal and cultural development of American Samoa.”400 To
obey this order, the district court should have focused much more on Samoan law
than culture, and a consideration of the American Samoa Constitution could have
been helpful in performing this essentially legal task. Indeed, interpreting a constitution, even if a foreign one, is something that we can reasonably expect a federal court
to do with competence. By limiting courts to interpreting the nation’s constitution,
rather than having them speculate about its cultural mores, we can be assured that
in applying the “anomalous” prong, judges will not be engaging in a free-wheeling
foray into another culture’s traditions.
This approach of considering only the foreign nation’s constitution is further
supported by the Ninth Circuit’s decision in the Wabol case, where the court consulted the NMI Constitution to determine whether it would be anomalous to apply
the Equal Protection Clause to the territory’s ethnic restrictions on the alienation of
property.401 The court found that it would indeed be anomalous because “Article XII,
section 1 [of the NMI Constitution] provides that ‘[t]he acquisition of permanent and
long-term interests in real property within the Commonwealth shall be restricted to
persons of Northern Marianas descent,’”402 and this provision establishes “the vital
role native ownership of land plays in the preservation of NMI social and cultural
stability.”403 Therefore, the court concluded, “[i]t would truly be anomalous to
construe the equal protection clause to force the United States to break its pledge to
preserve and protect NMI culture and property.”404 The Ninth Circuit thus suggested
that the “anomalous” part of the standard turns on whether an inconsistency would
arise between, on the one hand, applying a particular provision of the U.S. Constitution in a territory and, on the other hand, protecting some value expressed in the
constitution governing that territory. In the Wabol case, it was clear that such an
inconsistency would arise between the Equal Protection Clause’s prohibition of
governmental racial classifications and the NMI Constitution’s protection of land on
the basis of a racial or ethnic classification.405 In effect, the Equal Protection Clause
prohibited an act that the NMI Constitution required, thus creating a sharp legal inconsistency and distinctly anomalous application of the Constitution abroad.
My proposal of consulting a foreign nation’s constitution addresses the three significant problems in Neuman’s approach, enumerated above. One, whereas Neuman’s
400
401
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proposal to look to international human-rights norms permits, and perhaps even encourages, judges to apply the U.S. Constitution in a way that comports with those
norms, thus violating conservative admonitions against having the U.S. Constitution
track international law,406 this issue would not seem to be raised by my proposed
approach of looking to a foreign nation’s constitution for the purpose of determining
whether the application of the U.S. Constitution would be anomalous in that land.
Indeed, there are very different foci at issue in these approaches. Recall that under
Neuman’s approach, the focus is international human-rights law, not the constitutional law prevailing in the land in question.407 For this reason, the result of his approach would not actually be a determination about whether it would be anomalous
to apply the U.S. Constitution in that specific land.408 Rather, the likely result of such
an approach would be for judges to smuggle international norms into our constitutional jurisprudence in the name of the “impracticable and anomalous” standard. In
effect, Neuman’s approach would likely lead judges to use international norms to
determine the meaning of our Constitution, not to determine the extent to which
applying a particular meaning of our Constitution conflicts with the legal tradition
prevailing in the land in which the claim arose. Only this latter determination is
called for by the Supreme Court’s framework.409
In my proposed approach, however, a court would simply be consulting the foreign constitution to determine whether the legal tradition governing that land would
fit in that instance with applying the U.S. Constitution there. This approach would
accept the meaning of the U.S. Constitution, as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme
Court, but look to a foreign nation’s constitution only for the purpose of determining
the fit between that nation’s constitution and what our Supreme Court has interpreted our Constitution to mean. Because this would not involve using foreign law
at all in interpreting the content of our Constitution, it would seem that even conservatives like Justice Scalia would be on board with this method of applying the
“anomalous” prong.
To illustrate this distinction between my proposed approach and Neuman’s
formula, consider, again, our hypothetical case involving a constitutional challenge
to the U.S. government’s seeking of the death penalty in Iraq. Under Neuman’s approach to the “anomalous” prong, the question would be whether international
human-rights law permits the death penalty, a question that a judge who opposes the
death penalty could reasonably answer in the negative. But under my approach, the
question would be simply whether on this issue there is an inconsistency between
the U.S. Constitution and the Iraqi Constitution. Indeed, under my approach, a court
would begin its analysis by considering whether the Eighth Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, permits this particular use of the death penalty. If our
406
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Eighth Amendment would permit this use of the death penalty, the analysis under the
“anomalous” prong would be over. There would be no way for foreign law to turn a
U.S. constitutional permission norm into a prohibition norm. But if our Eighth Amendment would not permit it—say, because the defendant was a minor—then the question
would be whether it would be permissible under the Iraqi Constitution. If the Iraqi
Constitution would permit it, then the “anomalous” prong would forbid the application
of the Eighth Amendment to this case. But if the Iraqi Constitution did not permit it,
then it would not be anomalous to apply the Eighth Amendment to that case and
then the only remaining question would be whether it would be impracticable for it
to apply. As this hypothetical case illustrates, there is a significant difference between
Neuman’s approach and the one presented in this Article, with Neuman’s approach
calling for American judges to use international law to guide their interpretations of
the U.S. Constitution, and my framework forbidding that mode of analysis.410
Another important difference between these approaches is that whereas my proposal to look to a foreign nation’s constitution would not find it anomalous to apply
a U.S. constitutional guarantee in a land where a similar constitutional value prevails, Neuman’s focus on international human-rights law would be too permissive.
Neuman’s approach would find that it would be anomalous to enforce any American
constitutional guarantee that is not supported by international human-rights law,
even if it would not be anomalous in that land due to its constitution providing for
the same guarantee as the U.S. Constitution.411
Note how this is the inverse problem of the one described above. The first problem with Neuman’s approach is that it is too restrictive, in that it binds the U.S.
Constitution to the constraints of international law, but the second problem is that
it is too permissive, in that it frees the U.S. Constitution of constraints that are
fundamental not only to our system and but also to the land in which the claim
arose. For example, if the United States were to promote Hinduism in India, that
would violate both our Establishment Clause and the Indian Constitution’s prohibition against sect preferentialism. But this would not violate international humanrights law, for there is no international disestablishmentarian norm.412 So under
Neuman’s approach, this promotion of Hinduism would be permissible, even though
it would violate both the U.S. Constitution and the Indian Constitution. Under my
approach, however, so long as it would be practicable to apply our Establishment
Clause prohibition of sect preferentialism to this case, this promotion of Hinduism
would be impermissible, because it would not be anomalous to apply this norm in
India, given that India has a similar prohibition of sect preferentialism in its constitutional order.
410
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Finally, the third problem we identified in Neuman’s approach is that, by focusing on international human-rights law instead of the legal tradition prevailing in the
particular land in which the claim arose, his approach contravenes the entire purpose
of the “anomalous” prong: to respect the legal and cultural tradition prevailing in the
particular land where the claim has arisen. My proposal of looking to the constitution governing that particular land satisfies this purpose. And it does this without
making judges act like anthropologists. Indeed, it limits judges to an inquiry for
which they are extremely well-suited—the legal determination of the meaning of a
country’s constitution.
But just like Neuman’s approach, my proposed approach has its weaknesses.
One problem in my approach is that many nations consist of heterogeneous cultures,
and some of these cultures are politically autonomous within their nations,413 thus
raising the question of which constitutional norms will govern the analysis in these
autonomous regions. In Iraq, for example, Kurdistan is an autonomous entity within
the Federal Iraqi Republic.414 In such regions, it seems that the proper inquiry is what
constitution governs that land; it is that governing constitution that will guide the
question of whether it would be anomalous to apply a particular American constitutional value there. So, in Kurdistan, the question would turn on the Iraqi Constitution,
not the Kurdish laws, because the Iraqi Constitution governs that territory.
A more troubling problem in my proposed approach is of an interpretive nature:
how are American courts to interpret a foreign constitution? By consulting the text of
the foreign constitution? Or the nation’s authoritative interpretations of that text? And
what if the nation is like Israel or Great Britain and does not have a unified written
constitution? These are thorny questions, to be sure. But it is important to remember
that my proposed approach does not present nearly as narrow an inquiry as the one
presented by a conflicts of law case, in which a court determines for that particular controversy whether those facts, if presented in another jurisdiction, would be lawful.415
Here, by contrast, a court would simply consult the law of another jurisdiction to
determine more generally whether that law evinces a certain constitutional value.
For example, in the question of USAID’s funding of mosques in Iraq, the issue
would not be whether the Iraqi Constitution specifically prohibits the government’s
funding of religious buildings. Rather, the question would be much more general—
whether the Iraqi Constitution creates a general separation between government and
413
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religion. This general question is very easy to answer: the Iraqi Constitution does
not create such a separation because Article II provides that “Islam is the official
religion of the State and is a foundation source of legislation,”416 and that “[n]o law
may be enacted that contradicts the established provisions of Islam.”417 And many
countries would present similarly easy questions on how their constitutions treat the
relationship between religion and government. For example, the current Indian418 and
Russian419 Constitutions expressly require a separation of religion and government,
but the Pakistani420 and Saudi Arabian421 Constitutions expressly reject separation by
establishing Islam as the official religion. Therefore, if the USAID mosque-funding
controversy arose in India or Russia, it would be clear that applying American-style
disestablishmentarianism in these nations would not be anomalous, whereas it clearly
would be in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.
But difficult questions can arise even under this general approach. One type of
problem might arise if a country’s constitution does not even address that issue—
say, if the hypothetical cases discussed above arose in a land governed by a constitution that simply ignored the church-state question. A similar problem might arise if
the country did not have a unified written constitution at all. In such cases, it would
seem best to turn to the authoritative interpretations of that country’s constitution
to see if those interpretations evince a constitutional value on the issue in question.
Great Britain and Israel illustrate how easy it is to apply this framework in at least
some cases. Neither country has a written constitution,422 but both nations have deep
constitutional traditions, and their case law makes clear that in many contexts the
state has broad authority over the funding of religion.423
A more challenging type of problem might arise if the text of a country’s constitution conflicted with the authoritative interpretations of that text. For example,
Article 20 of the Japanese Constitution requires a separation of religion and government.424 But the Grand Bench of the Japanese Supreme Court has found this
separation to be relatively weak, and on this ground has permitted the government to
416

Article 2, Section 1, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of
Iraq] of 2005.
417
Id.
418
INDIA CONST. preamble, art. 2.
419
KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 14 (Russ.).
420
PAKISTAN CONST. art. 2.
421
Basic Law of Government (1992), Art 1.
422
Overview of the UK System of Government, DIRECTGOV, http://www.direct.gov.uk/en
/Governmentcitizensandrights/UKgovernment/Centralgovernmentandthemonarchy/DG
_073438 (last visited Oct. 14, 2012); THE STATE: The Law of the Land, ISRAEL MINISTRY
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Nov. 28, 2010), http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Facts+About+Israel/State
/THE+STATE-+The+Law+of+the+Land.htm.
423
See, e.g., Shimon Shetreet, Freedom of Religion in Israel, ISRAEL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS (Aug. 20, 2001), available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009
/2001/8/Freedom+of+Religion+in+Israel.htm.
424
NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 20 (Japan).

2012] A CLARIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION’S APPLICATION ABROAD

233

fund Shinto ceremonies.425 Overall though, the Japanese Supreme Court has honored
this government-religion separation, as evidenced in its 1997 ruling forbidding the
use of public funding for a religious memorial service.426 So a general overview of
the Japanese constitutional order, based on both its written constitution and the
authoritative interpretations of that text, suggests that it would not be anomalous to
apply American-style disestablishmentarianism in that land.
These interpretive issues, therefore, should not present insuperable problems for
courts. In most cases, a court will not even encounter any of these interpretive problems because the foreign constitution will unambiguously express a general constitutional value and the authoritative interpretations of that text will be consistent with
that value. And in the cases where there are such problems—either because of the
lack of a written constitution, textual silence or ambiguity on the subject in question,
or authoritative interpretations that contravene the text—American courts still seem
well equipped to resolve the issue by gleaning from the general thrust of that nation’s
constitutional tradition.
Now that we have covered how courts should interpret the “impracticable” and
“anomalous” prongs, we have only one more question to address: how do these
prongs fit together? That is, do they create a conjunctive or disjunctive test? That is
the subject of the next and final subsection of the Article.
C. Is the “Impracticable and Anomalous” Standard a Conjunctive or
Disjunctive Test?
As is evident from the above discussion, the terms “impracticable” and “anomalous” have substantially different meanings in this context. Whereas the “impracticable” prong focuses on whether, given the U.S. presence in a land, the United States is
capable of enforcing a particular constitutional provision in that land, the “anomalous”
prong focuses on whether an inconsistency would arise between that provision and
some value expressed in the constitution governing that territory. As Daniel E. Hall
puts it in his article on the subject:
Both definitional and legal analyses lead to the inescapable conclusion that the terms impractical and anomalous represent two
different tests, and the omission of either from the analysis may
result in a decision that is illegitimate to the people of a territory
or contrary to the foreign affairs interests of the United States.427
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Surprisingly, though, this distinction between these terms is often overlooked. As
mentioned above, Justice Harlan in his Reid concurrence seemed to treat the “anomalous” prong as simply part of the “impracticable/impractical” prong. Lower courts
have similarly been slipshod in not clearly distinguishing the two parts of the test.
Perhaps one reason for the conflation of the two parts of the test is that there is
some conceptual overlap: if it would be anomalous to apply an American constitutional norm in a territory due to a conflict with a constitutional norm governing that
land, then that state of affairs also often would make it impracticable to apply the
U.S. constitutional norm there. For example, if a foreign nation does not provide for
a right to a jury trial, then that not only might make it anomalous to apply the Sixth
Amendment’s right to a jury trial in that land, but it also might make it impracticable
to do so, because providing a jury trial in such a nation would require the United
States to create an entirely new cultural and governmental infrastructure (e.g., the
United States might have to develop a jury selection process and train jurors).428
Likewise, just as there is some conceptual overlap between the “impracticable”
and “anomalous” prongs but still sufficient conceptual distance to justify making them
two separate parts of the analysis, these two prongs also overlap with the inquiry
into whether the United States controls a given territory. As mentioned above, if the
United States controls an area, the “impracticable and anomalous” standard applies
if and only if the case does not involve a fundamental right; and if the United States
does not control an area, the standard applies if and only if the case does involve a
fundamental right.429 But these are not conceptually independent inquiries, for the
“control” question will influence the analysis under the “impracticable and anomalous” standard. Indeed, if the United States controls an area, it is often more practicable to apply an American constitutional guarantee there and less anomalous to do so.
For example, because the United States absolutely controls Guantanamo Bay, so that
there is no other governmental presence there, it is more practicable to apply habeas
corpus in that land (given the U.S. resources there) and less anomalous to do so
(given that there is no conflicting constitutional authority governing the territory).430
Nevertheless, the inquiries are sufficiently distinct that they can be kept as separate modes of analysis. In most cases, the “control” inquiry may influence, but will
not determine, the application of the standard. We see evidence of this in the Iraqi
case. Before the recent withdrawal from Iraq, the United States still controlled
several parts of the nation, but this control did not mean that it was always practicable to apply a particular American constitutional norm there; nor did it mean that
428
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it would not have been anomalous to apply such a norm in Iraq, especially given the
creation in 2005 of the Iraqi Constitution, which in many ways is inconsistent with
the U.S. Constitution.431 This illustrates how the “impracticable and anomalous”
standard is not only a binary standard but also a mode of analysis that courts must
treat as distinct from the question of whether the United States controls an area.
Therefore, given that the “impracticable and anomalous” standard is a conceptually independent and binary legal test, we must address whether it is disjunctive or
conjunctive. If it is disjunctive, then it would be easier for the U.S. government to
evade a constitutional norm abroad, because it would mean that whenever it was
either impracticable or anomalous to apply that norm, the United States would be
free to ignore the norm and proceed with its policy mission. But if the standard were
conjunctive, of course, it would be much more difficult for the United States to
evade a constitutional norm, because doing so would require satisfying both factors.
Courts almost always state the standard as “impracticable and anomalous,” suggesting that the test is conjunctive. But this might be a mere linguistic convention in
reciting the standard, with no logical significance. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
never expressly affirmed that it is a conjunctive standard, and no lower court has
directly taken up this subject. Because there is so little law on this issue—just the
use of “and” in the standard’s formulation—it is very tempting to answer the question
by turning to one’s policy sensibilities (i.e., to urge for a disjunctive standard if one
prefers making it harder for courts to apply the Constitution abroad, and a conjunctive standard for the opposite result).
But we can resist this temptation by reminding ourselves of the twin goals of the
standard: to ensure that U.S. foreign policy is both effective (practicable) and culturally sensitive (not anomalous).432 These two goals seem to be of similar importance, both being worthy of not applying the Constitution in that instance. Indeed,
the precedents on the Constitution’s transnational applicability have emphasized the
importance of each feature of the standard, indicating that each prong is sufficiently
powerful to nullify constitutional applicability.433 Moreover, as mentioned above,
a central feature of law is not to require anything that is impossible to accomplish,
thus strongly suggesting that the Constitution should not apply in a land when it
would be impracticable to do so.434 Likewise, a fundamental feature of our constitutional scheme is that the judiciary must respect how the political branches conduct
foreign affairs,435 which requires that courts not apply the Constitution in a way that
431

See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 416–17 (discussing the Iraqi Constitution’s
establishment of religion).
432
See Merriam, supra note 6, at 746–47.
433
See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 277–78 (1990) (citing Reid v.
Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
434
FULLER, supra note 319, at 39.
435
For examples of powers in foreign affairs delegated to the legislative and executive
branches, see U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3, 5; art. 1, § 9, cl. 8; art. 1, § 10, cl. 3; art. 2, § 2.

236

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 21:171

would compel the U.S. government to act in a foreign nation inconsistently with that
nation’s constitutional norms.436 Reasoning from both within and without this area
of law, therefore, leads to the conclusion that it is a disjunctive standard, despite the
fact that courts use the word “and” in combining the terms.
Moreover, even though courts describe it as the “impracticable and anomalous”
standard, there is some indication that they have nonetheless treated it as disjunctive.
For example, Justice Harlan, in applying the standard in Reid, focused only on the
impracticability/impracticality of extending the jury trial right abroad.437 So to the extent that he found this “impracticability/impracticality” prong conceptually distinct
from the “anomalous” prong, Harlan suggested that he thought the impracticability/
impracticality of applying the Sixth Amendment to “run-of-the-mill offenses” was
sufficient to render it inapplicable in those instances.438 This would make it a disjunctive standard. Likewise, in his Boumediene opinion, Kennedy also suggested that
it is a disjunctive standard by declaring that “if the [Guantanamo] detention facility
were located in an active theater of war, arguments that issuing the writ would be
‘impracticable or anomalous’ would have more weight.”439 Of course, we cannot place
too much emphasis on Kennedy’s use of “or” here, not only because he did not actually apply the standard in the Boumediene opinion440 but also because he has used
“and” in every other instance in which he has recited the standard.441 Nevertheless, his
use of “or” here does suggest something about how he believes the standard applies.
Some scholars have also argued that, as a normative matter, the standard should
be disjunctive. Most notably, Professor Stanley K. Laughlin, Jr. has urged courts to
adopt this interpretation. He first advanced this argument in a 1981 article explaining that, to preserve American Samoan culture, the standard must be disjunctive.442
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Laughlin based his interpretation largely on the ground that the U.S. Constitution is
not a genocide pact, “whether we define genocide as physically destroying a people
or killing their culture.”443 Laughlin’s language was approvingly cited in the Ninth
Circuit’s Wabol opinion, with the court explaining that because the U.S. Constitution
does not warrant such cultural genocide, the Equal Protection Clause could not be
interpreted to forbid racial classifications in the NMI, given that it would be anomalous to apply such a restriction in a land in which the constitution guaranteed ethnicbased restrictions on land alienation.444
Twenty-four years after publishing that article, Laughlin published another
article on the subject.445 In that article, Laughlin expresses support for the Wabol
opinion, not only because of its approving citation of his work, but “mainly because
[he] firmly believe[s] that it articulates a good and useful rule,”446 that is, “a rule that
allows the residents of U.S. territories to enjoy the core constitutional rights of U.S.
citizens while at the same time avoiding a mechanical application of constitutional
interpretations from the mainland that might damage or destroy their indigenous
cultures.”447 Looking to the Wabol decision, as well as to Harlan’s Reid concurrence
and the district court and D.C. Circuit opinions in King, Laughlin “conclude[s] that
these are separate tests and that either one could justify a departure from mainland
constitutional norms.”448 Therefore, “a fundamental right will apply in a territory only
if it can be shown to be both practical and not anomalous.”449 In other words, a fundamental right will not apply if doing so would be either impracticable or anomalous.
In sum, based on the two values underlying the standard (i.e., legal efficacy and
cultural sensitivity), based on how courts have applied the standard, and based on
how commentators have construed it, the best interpretation is that it is a disjunctive
standard. We can thus summarize this area of the law with the following framework:
if a constitutional claim arises in a land over which the U.S. exercises absolute control or exclusive jurisdiction, and if the court deems that the claim involves a fundamental meaning of the Constitution, then the court should apply the Constitution
abroad as it would apply if the claim had arisen domestically. And if neither of these
conditions is satisfied, then the court should not enforce the Constitution at all. But
if only one of these conditions is met, the court should apply the Constitution as it
would apply domestically unless it would be either impracticable or anomalous to
do so.
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CONCLUSION
As mentioned in the Introduction, Professor Burnett does not support the
“impracticable or450 anomalous” standard, because she does not see it as capable of
sufficiently constraining judicial discretion.451 She therefore concludes that it is a
“functionalist” standard that will amount to nothing more than judges consulting
their policy preferences to determine whether to apply a particular constitutional provision to a particular set of circumstances.452 She thus urges courts to focus on how,
rather than whether, the Constitution should apply in a particular instance. But her
proposed approach requires courts to tailor particular applications to particular facts,
thereby inviting the very type of convenience-based jurisprudence that she rejects.453
A clearer “impracticable or anomalous” standard, such as the one articulated in
this Article, seems to satisfy Burnett’s criticisms better than her own approach does. In
particular, the type of principled decisionmaking that Burnett seeks in applying the
standard can be secured by taking the following four steps: (1) by conceptually separating the “fundamentality” and “control” analyses from the “anomalous or impracticable”
inquiry, (2) by defining the “impracticable” prong as turning on the capabilities of the
United States to enforce a particular constitutional provision in a particular area, (3) by
defining the “anomalous” prong as turning on whether there is an inconsistency between, on the one hand, the U.S. constitutional provision at issue, and on the other hand,
some constitutional value governing the land where the claim arose, and (4) by treating
the standard as disjunctive, thus providing that under this standard the U.S. Constitution will not apply when it would be either impracticable or anomalous to do so.
These four issues all address matters vitally important to the Constitution’s extraterritoriality. One, by separating the “fundamentality” and “control” analyses from
the “anomalous or impracticable” inquiry, we can ensure that courts will account for
what is truly fundamental to our constitutional scheme, thus guarding against the
temptation to dilute domestic constitutional jurisprudence through transnational application. This will also ensure that courts hold the United States accountable when it
controls an area, an issue of central importance to broader notions of liberal governance. Two, by precisely defining “impracticable” as referring to physical difficulty
rather than simple imprudence, courts can promote the efficacy of U.S. foreign affairs while still permitting the political branches to evaluate the wisdom of various foreign policies, free from judicial intrusion. Three, by defining “anomalous” to refer to
an inconsistency between the U.S. Constitution and the constitutional tradition governing the land in which the claim arose, courts can make our foreign affairs more culturally sensitive. Finally, by treating the “impracticable and anomalous” standard as
450
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a disjunctive test, courts can ensure that policy efficacy and cultural sensitivity are
each treated as sufficiently weighty values to override constitutional applicability.
But importantly, in promoting these four important values—i.e., domestic constitutional integrity, governmental accountability, policy efficacy, and cultural sensitivity—
this framework does not permit judges to weigh U.S. interests. To the contrary of some
representations of the framework,454 such interest-based considerations do not enter
the analysis at any juncture. Burnett’s concerns about judges applying the standard
based on U.S. interests therefore do not come into play under my proposed framework.
With these clarifications of the framework, we can see its formal elements, elements that thus far have largely been obscured by conflations of terms and manipulations of fuzzy doctrinal boundaries. That is not to say that the framework is entirely
formalist; indeed, it is also imbued with functionalism. In particular, the Boumediene
decision moved the framework away from the simple formalism of the Incorporation
Doctrine, which had turned on whether Congress had officially incorporated a territory.455 Boumediene made this a much more practical question of whether the United
States has actually exercised control over the area where the claim arose,456 an inquiry
that makes the United States constitutionally accountable for its actual actions rather
than for only formal congressional declarations. Moreover, the functional elements of
the “impracticable or anomalous” standard, as I have interpreted the doctrine, are apparent from its warrant for some judicial discretion. Determining impracticability will
not call for a theoretical inquiry into the general capabilities of the United States to
enforce a constitutional provision abroad, but rather a more fact-based analysis into
whether, given its presence in the area, the United States is capable of accomplishing
a particular mission there. And determining whether it would be anomalous to apply a
constitutional provision in a land will turn not simply on whether there is a direct textual conflict between the U.S. constitutional provision and the relevant foreign constitution, but rather on whether there is a conflict of constitutional values, based on a
comprehensive examination of the foreign constitution and the authoritative interpretations of that text. This healthy bit of judicial discretion will be necessary to ensure that
there is some flexibility in this area of the law, but this flexibility will be tightly circumscribed so that the objectivity and predictability of the framework will not be lost.
From this analysis, we can learn an important lesson about the law more generally. The debate over this issue thus far has been obscured by some oversimplifications of what it means for the law to be formalist and functionalist, and some
454
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oversimplifications of how this area of the law fits with that distinction. This framework, like much of constitutional law, consists of both formalist and functionalist
components. But we often talk of the law as though it fits with only one of these
theories. For example, in his Boumediene opinion, Justice Kennedy writes that a formalistic reading of this area of the law “overlooks what [the Court] see[s] as a common
thread uniting the Insular Cases, Eisentrager, and Reid: the idea that questions of
extraterritoriality turn on objective factors and practical concerns, not formalism.”457
Professor Neuman finds that in this statement Kennedy “is clearly correct that a functional approach informed the adoption of the Insular Cases doctrine, the concurring
opinions in Reid v. Covert, and Kennedy’s own opinion in Verdugo-Urquidez.”458
Neuman sees the approach as functionalist due to its balancing of various interests,
but in making this characterization, Neuman seems to overlook the thoroughly
formalist nature of much of the analysis, in that it calls for judges to make a substantive determination of what constitutes a fundamental right and that the framework
consists of a closed system of necessary and sufficient conditions. And even in
countering Neuman’s support of functionalism in this area of the law, Burnett uses
the same discourse, resisting the standard on the ground that its functionalism grants
judges too much discretion, thereby leading to policy-driven outcomes.459
These two leading lights on the Constitution’s transnational applicability have
thus framed this issue along the lines of the grand debate in legal theory over
formalism and functionalism. Yet, before we get further entangled in this age-old
battle between formalism and functionalism, we should pause to consider its applicability to the “impracticable or anomalous” standard, given that the standard, like
the framework of which it is a part, consists of both formalist and functionalist
elements. If defined and applied with sufficient rigor, as proposed in this Article, the
standard promises to provide the best that these two approaches have to offer: the
consistent and principled decisionmaking of formalism, and the flexible and commonsensical decisionmaking of functionalism. As a result, the “impracticable or
anomalous” standard will be both more practicable as a judicial doctrine and less
anomalous in the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence.
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